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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines Hezbollah’s transition from their violent forms of political 
expression after their founding in 1984, to their involvement in the Lebanese electoral 
system in 1992. Drawing on the instrumental and organizational approaches for 
studying group behavior, this thesis examines the external instrumental factors and 
internal organizational factors that contributed to the political evolution of Hezbollah 
from an organization focused primarily on violent forms of political expression to an 
organization that primarily uses the parliamentary process. Examining Hezbollah’s 
transition and using it as a point of reference, the thesis exposes weaknesses of 
conventional International Relations analytical approaches to studying terrorist 
organizations and provides a more objective approach to studying political violence. It 
argues that the pejorative nature of the term terrorism, combined with problems 
developing a consensus on defining terrorism, limit the term’s usefulness for academics 
attempting to objectively examine political violence. 
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Chapter 1: Topic Background, Research Questions, and 
Thesis Structure 
1.1 Introduction of Topic 
The success of a terrorist organization is most often measured in terms of either 
its ability to attain its stated political ends or its capacity for destruction. Few 
organizations actually attain the long term ideological objectives they claim to seek and 
the destructive abilities of terrorist organizations have always paled in comparison to, 
and are often countered quickly by, their state counterparts. Therefore, many foreign 
policy analysts and scholars have concluded that terrorism is objectively a failure. But 
what about groups that continue their ideological struggle by means other than 
terrorism? Before bombs and microchip detonators, there was black powder explosives, 
and before those explosives there were daggers and poisons. Can the effectiveness of 
terrorist organizations really be measured by its capacity for destruction? A cursory 
look at the evolution of terrorism suggests it has been mostly a change in targets and 
technology rather than in tactics and intent. The attacks in the United States on 
September 11, 2001 seems to have focused most scholarly research on explaining, and 
recommending ways to prevent, large scale attacks of that magnitude moving forward. 
Terrorism, however, is only one of several behavioral responses to disaffection with 
political, social, or economic conditions. Nothing suggests that organizations that are 
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founded for the purpose of political violence are incapable of transforming themselves 
into something different when the opportunity arises.  
This thesis will examine the creation, and transformation, of Hezbollah in 
Lebanon from the early 1980s to their first electoral victory in Lebanese politics in 1992. 
By focusing initially on the cultural, economic, and political factors that facilitated 
Hezbollah’s founding, before moving on to their resistance ideology and activities, the 
aim of this thesis will be to provide a thorough analysis of not only how Hezbollah 
came to be a major influence in Lebanese politics, but to explain how they were 
successfully able to transition from violent to non-violent forms of political expression 
and gain domestic and international legitimacy as a political organization. Furthermore, 
I argue that this analysis of Hezbollah exposes the current limitations of the 
predominant amount of academic research on terrorism. The common view in 
International Relations, that terrorism is a problem for Western societies and requires 
academics and policy makers to search for a solution, demonstrates not only the 
pejorative and problematic nature of defining terrorism, but also the flawed approach 
of current theories studying terrorism that apply these biases to groups such as 
Hezbollah. This thesis examines Hezbollah’s political transition, and what that 
transition means in the context of terrorism research, by focusing on the organizational 
evolution of the group within the context of instrumental and organizational dynamics.  
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1.2 Brief History of Terrorism and Terrorism Research 
Even ancient societies experienced what we now call political terrorism as a form 
of non-sanctioned violence in response to perceived injustice – that is, violence not 
condoned by the rules of war or required for the maintenance of public order. The 
earliest examples of terrorist activity contained none of the pejorative connotations 
associated with modern definitions. The original usage, in fact, was used to describe the 
actions of government and those that pursued political ambitions representative of the 
people. The difference between modern and historical definitions will be highlighted 
below before focusing on several key characteristics that will be used to inform my 
research moving forward.  
In contrast to its contemporary usage, the word ‘terrorism’ originally applied to 
actions committed by the state and was first popularized during the French Revolution.1 
The system, or “régime de la terreur”, in place during 1793 and 1794 was adopted as a 
means to establish order during the period of turmoil and upheaval that followed the 
uprisings of 1789. Thus, unlike terrorism as it is commonly understood today, to mean 
an anti-government activity undertaken by non-state or subnational entities, terrorism 
originally was an instrument of governance wielded by the state.2 The “régime de la 
terreur” was used to consolidate the new government’s power by intimidating any 
                                                          
1  Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 15. 
2  Ibid. 
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individuals or groups the new regime regarded as enemies of the people, typically by 
publicly executing persons convicted of treasonous crimes by guillotine. Early 
revolutionary leaders, such as Maximilien Robespierre who proclaimed “virtue, without 
which terror is evil; terror, without which virtue is helpless”, firmly believed that 
during periods of violent political transition terrorism was necessary in order for the 
revolutionary cause to triumph.3 
Unsurprisingly, individuals and groups struggling to exercise their political will 
in oppressive states transitioned the definition of terrorism away from being associated 
primarily with state tactics to one used exclusively by non-state actors to address their 
grievances. Terrorism in its contemporary usage is a threat that thrives on asymmetrical 
expressions of power.4 An unassailable standardized definition of terrorism is all but 
impossible to provide because it is intended to be a matter of perception and therefore 
is regarded differently by different observers. These perceptions, however, are rooted in 
some fundamental aspects. At the root of terrorism is a person or group’s perception of 
justice for those misrepresented. The widespread acceptance of democratic 
governments internationally, and the underlying principle that these governments are 
representative of the people, has made it so the term terrorism is arguably unable to be 
applied to these states. The system of international norms for acceptable uses of force, 
                                                          
3  Ibid., 16. 
4  Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Sources of Contemporary Terrorism,” Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand 
Strategy (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 2. 
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conventions that explicitly forbid the use of terrorism, necessitate that the definition be 
applied primarily to non-state actors. The nature of international conflict means that in 
contemporary usage terrorism is mostly a pejorative term, aimed at non-state actors by 
their state counterparts to discredit any legitimate claim to exercising political authority. 
Regardless of its usage, however, for the purpose of this thesis a few basic 
characteristics should be kept in mind moving forward. 
Despite the discrepancy between contemporary and historical understandings of 
terrorism three key characteristics remain constant.5 First, both versions of terrorism are 
neither random nor indiscriminate, as it is often portrayed today, but rather are 
organized, deliberate, and systematic. Second, the justification and goal of terrorism is 
the creation of a new and better society to replace one that is fundamentally corrupt and 
not representing the interests of the people the organization claims to represent. Last, 
terrorism concerns power and the ability of individuals or groups to express themselves 
politically and define the limitations of legitimate government. This elementary 
understanding of terrorism has allowed scholars, such as David Rapoport and Bruce 
Hoffman who inform much of the rest of this section, to identify the key time periods 
and similarities of terrorist organizations discussed below. 
                                                          
5  These characteristics are discussed at length in Bruce Hoffman’s Inside Terrorism (p13-45), however, 
definitions of terrorism incorporating these same characteristics were found across a wide range of authors while 
researching this thesis. These include Martha Crenshaw, Mark Juergensmeyer, Jessica Stern, and David Rapoport 
among others whose works can be found in the bibliography. 
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The necessity of killing the unjust ruler is a notion that lies at the heart of the 
modern justification of terrorism and that can be found in political treatises throughout 
the centuries. As far back as Aristotle and the Greeks, tyrannical rulers were considered 
a pathological departure from the desirable forms of state governance. The famous 
Roman philosopher Cicero went even further when he wrote that “it is a virtue to kill 
tyrants”, and that they “should be erased from human society. For, just as certain parts 
of our bodies are amputated if they appear to begin to appear bloodless and lifeless, so 
these cruel and ravenous beasts in human form should be cut off from what may be 
called mankind”.6 This sentiment was the driving force behind the foundation of many 
of the ethno-nationalist and separatist groups during the post-colonial era in the 20th 
century. The changes to the international environment that developed as a consequence 
of the Treaty of Versailles at the conclusion of World War I, mainly the application of 
principles of national self-determination to break up empires of the defeated states in 
Europe, were reinforced and compounded by the results of World War II.  
The proliferation of ethno-nationalist and revolutionary terrorism during the 
period following World War II occurred for two main reasons. First, it showed that once 
dominant colonial powers were not unbeatable and empowered marginalized 
populations globally to pursue their own political goals against systems that were 
                                                          
6  Marcus Tullius Cicero, Brutus, on the Nature of the Gods, on Divination, on Duties, ed. Richard Mckeon 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), 571.  
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mostly imposed upon them. Second, the Treaty of Versailles, by creating law that was 
inspired by principles of self-determination post-World War I, undermined the 
legitimacy of the empires that were left at the conclusion of the both the major conflicts 
and lead to the proliferation of resistance groups globally. 
Terrorism motivated by ethno-nationalist and separatist aspirations existed well 
before 1945, but it was only after World War II that the phenomenon became a more 
prevalent global occurrence. Two of the primary reasons for the development of post-
war anti-colonial movements were that the war demonstrated the vulnerability of once 
powerful empires and simultaneously displayed the hypocrisy of wartime pledges of 
support for indigenous people and their right to self-determination.7 The Japanese 
conquest of Southeast Asia against British colonial forces and the proclamation of the 
Atlantic Charter exerted a strong influence on post-war ethno-nationalist and separatist 
movements post-war.  
On February 15th, 1942 the British Empire suffered the worst defeat in its history 
when Singapore fell to invading Japanese forces. The capture of Singapore, which was 
considered the “outstanding symbol of Western Power in the Far East”, led to what 
Basil Liddell Hart describes as the “shattering of British, and European, prestige in 
                                                          
7  Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 45. 
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Asia”.8 Within weeks of Singapore’s capture Japan also conquered Indonesia, which had 
been under Dutch control, and Burma. Hong Kong was conceded the previous 
Christmas, and more than a year before that Japan had imposed its rule on what was 
once French controlled Indochina.9 Finally, the surrender of the American garrison on 
Corregidor Island in the Philippines in May 1942 completed Japan’s conquest of 
Southeast Asia, and subsequently the dissolution of the British, French, Dutch, and 
American influence there. The display of colonial vulnerability by the Japanese fostered 
and encouraged the post-war spread of not only Asiatic, but global revolt against 
European domination or intrusion into domestic affairs. 
The realization that colonial powers were not undefeatable was coupled with a 
sweeping ideological shift for states and peoples globally. Starting with the Treaty of 
Versailles post World War I, the international system began to embrace laws and norms 
founded on principles of national self-determination.10 Although individual groups 
have unique characteristics and arise in specific local contexts, examining the broad 
historical patterns reveals a connection between ethno-nationalist terrorist groups and 
the sweeping change of political and ideological concepts following World War I and 
                                                          
8  B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: Paragon Books, 1979), 233. 
9  Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 46. 
10  David Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand 
Strategy (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 53. 
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continuing today.11 The acceptance and promotion of principles of national self-
determination was the ideological shift that created an environment where terrorist 
groups could flourish. 
The dissolution of empires and the search for a new distribution of political 
power provided an opportunity for an increased number of terrorist groups throughout 
the twentieth-century. The post-World War II backlash against the colonial powers and 
the attractiveness of national independence movements led to the creation of a number 
of new states often born from violence. Arguments over the justice of international 
causes and the designation of terrorist struggles as conflicts regarding “national 
liberation” continue today, with consequentialist philosophies excusing the violence if 
the cause in the long run was “just”.12 The philosophical debate is essentially a 
stalemate, limited by human reasoning and no definitive authority on the matter and 
has led to the maturation of a new phase of terrorist activity that uses religion as the 
justification for action.  
Many of the ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups that define the 
previous wave also have a strong religious component. The overwhelmingly Catholic 
Irish Republican Army and their various Protestant counterparts, such as Ulster 
Freedom Fighters and Red Hand Commandos, the predominantly Muslim Palestine 
                                                          
11  Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve,” Contending with Terrorism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010), 33. 
12  Ibid. 34. 
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Liberation Organization, are clear examples of nationalist groups whose membership is 
dominated by a specific religious orientation.13 David Rapoport has described modern 
terrorism such as that perpetuated by al-Qaeda as part of the religiously inspired 
“fourth wave”.14 Religious terrorism, however, is not new but a continuation of an 
ongoing modern struggle between those with power and those without it. Unlike ethno-
nationalist and separatist groups, however, groups focused pre-dominantly on religious 
doctrine have the potential to be more dangerous than previous types of terrorist 
groups. 
The re-emergence of religious terrorist groups has the potential to be more 
dangerous for three main reasons. First, religious terrorists are often engaged in a 
Manichaean struggle of good against evil, implying an open-ended set of human 
targets.15 The exclusivity of their faith may lead them to dehumanize their targets 
because they consider non-members to be infidels or apostates. Second, these groups 
are engaging in violent behavior directly or indirectly to please the perceived 
commands of a deity.16 This is primarily an issue because it removes the philosophical 
debate described at the conclusion of the ethno-nationalist section.17 Arguments of 
                                                          
13  Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 87. 
14  Rapoport, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism, 55. 
15  Cronin, Behind the Curve, 39. 
16  Ibid. 
17  For more on the shift from ethno-nationalist terrorism to religious terrorism see: Jerrold M. Post, “The 
New Face of Terrorism: Socio-Cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism” in Behavioral Sciences and the 
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justice are irrelevant because the religious terrorist group believes their behavior is not 
constrained by concerns of human constituents, their laws, or their values. Last, 
religious terrorists can sometimes display a complete sense of alienation from the 
existing social system.18 The goals of these organizations are not related to attempting to 
correct flaws in the system, making it more just or perfect, but rather are trying to 
replace it entirely. These groups have a tendency to promote apocalyptic images of 
destruction as a necessary path to societal purification. 
 Religious terrorist organizations that promote apocalyptic images of destruction 
and replacing existing social systems struggle with organizational longevity. By self-
imposed necessity these groups are often very destructive, attempting to create the 
conditions that fulfill their prophetic visions for a new society. For example, Aum 
Shinrikyo, a small Japanese apocalyptic terrorist group, released vials of poisonous 
sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system killing and injuring commuters.19 The attack was 
not an attempt to simply kill the largest number of individuals, but rather the intention 
was to demonstrate the veracity of their leader’s prophecies about an imminent 
apocalyptic war.20 The nature of these groups influences their willingness to accept 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Law, Vol. 23, 451-465, (2005), and “When Hatred is Bred to the Bone: Psycho-cultural Foundations of 
Contemporary Terrorism” in Political Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 4, 615-636, (2006). 
18  Ibid. 
19  Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), 103.  
20  Ibid. 
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tactics that are typically more dangerous. As prophecies fail to materialize, however, the 
leadership of these organizations frequently loses legitimacy in the view of their 
membership. These problems together help explain why many apocalyptic groups 
experience shorter lifespans and are fewer in number than other types of terrorist 
organizations. 
Though apocalyptic terrorist groups exist, the majority of religious terrorist 
organizations are not apocalyptic. Political rhetoric often suggests that one religion, 
typically Islamic in nature, has a propensity to violence more so than another, but the 
argument is not made convincingly. Violent symbols and mythology are prevalent in 
every form of the most popular religions. The fact is that religion and violence are 
intimately bound together as the former often attempts to explain and justify the latter.21 
This allows charismatic and influential leaders to manipulate religious doctrine to 
exploit the powerful connection between religion and individual believers. Most 
religious terrorist organizations do just that, giving the group an aura of legitimacy they 
otherwise would not possess.22 Typically this manifests itself in combining a temporal 
social struggle with the cosmic struggle of order and disorder explained in religious 
doctrine. The psychological dimension of this power makes religious groups uniquely 
effective, justifying and motivating individuals to partake in suicide missions for 
                                                          
21  Mark Juergensmeyer, “The Logic of Religious Violence,” Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. 
Rapoport (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 180. 
22  Ibid., 181. 
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example. Combining struggles the individual can experience in the present, with the 
psychological and emotional cosmic struggles represented in religion, makes these 
groups attractive to large numbers of individuals and subsequently affords these 
organizations greater longevity and resources to pursue their goals. 
It is not surprising that religion has become a far more popular motivation for 
terrorism, especially in the post-Cold War era. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
discredited communist ideology as a viable alternative to the capitalist model. At the 
same time the promise of ample benefits from liberal-democratic, capitalist states, failed 
to materialize in many countries throughout the world. The end of the rigid bipolar 
structure imposed by the Cold War left those who rejected the capitalist ethical tenets of 
greed, consumption, and individuality searching for a viable ideological alternative.23 
Amongst nations with predominantly Muslim populations this period has been 
animated by widespread alienation combined with resurging elements of religious 
identity and doctrine. This has led to an increase in political violence by certain groups 
who are promoting their version of an Islamic world view. 
The contemporary Islamist call for global jihad in world politics follows the 
reasoning of one of the foremost thinkers of political Islam, Sayyid Qutb. His prophetic 
description of an “Islamic world revolution” has given rise to a real political movement 
                                                          
23  Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 92. 
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based on transnational religion.24 The overall context of this Islamic fundamentalism is 
the contemporary politicization of religion in countries of Islamic civilization as they 
undergo structural and moral crises.25 Caution must be exercised, however, when 
discussing Islamic fundamentalism. Scholars often use the term to encompass all violent 
groups subscribing to Islamic doctrine, but Islamic fundamentalism is not a single 
homogenous movement.26 Rather, many types of Islamic groups exist in different 
countries and sometimes within the same country. Some are state sponsored, used and 
promoted by one or other Muslim government for its own purposes; others are genuine 
popular movements created and reinforced from the ground up.27 Conservative and 
pre-emptive movements have been started by governments in power, such as Pakistan 
and most notably Saudi Arabia, as a means of protection from revolution.28 The 
fundamentalist movement of the other kind, with an authentic popular base and more 
important to the topic of this thesis, has been most successfully demonstrated by the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran.29  
                                                          
24  Bassam Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics, and Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam Versus Global 
Jihad (New York: Routledge, 2008), 101. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam (New York: Random House Inc. 2003), 23. 
27  Ibid., 24. 
28  Ibid. 
29  Ibid., 25. 
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In its formative years jihadist Islamism was an exclusively Sunni phenomenon 
aimed at toppling local regimes and establishing a shari’a state in the world of Islam.30 
The target of contemporary jihadist action is the international order of secular states 
known as the Westphalian order. Islamists envision replacing this order with a global 
Islamicate in which the house of Islam based on God’s rule is enhanced to map the 
entire globe.31 This is the real issue that defines the divides between Sunni and Shi’a 
fundamentalist groups – the war of ideas revolving around the strategy and 
appropriate method by which to pursue the future Islamic order of the world.32 Both the 
Sunni and Shi’a Islamist narratives are equally embedded into the worldview of the 
Islamic civilization despite the differences in legitimation underpinning each of them.33 
The analysis of global jihadism as an Islamist internationalism acknowledges the 
fact that most jihadists are non-state actors. However, the involvement of states like Iran 
and Saudi Arabia must also be taken into account. The core characteristics of 
contemporary jihadist groups pursuing nationalist goals are most often associated with 
Islamic groups in general and Iranian backed groups in particular. Unlike the Sunni 
Wahhabism promoted in Saudi Arabia, who incorporated Islamic law as a method of 
pre-emptively shielding the government from potential popular revolution, the root of 
                                                          
30  Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics, and Europe, 102. 
31  Ibid., 103. 
32  Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 133. 
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the Iranian-backed Islamic terrorist campaign is the aim of extending the 
fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law advocated in Iran to other Muslim 
countries globally.34 The Shi’a style of global jihadism promoted by Iran is unique 
because of its character as a revolution of the people and also in its religion-based 
legitimation. 
The Iranian revolution is held up as an example to Muslims throughout the 
world, exhorting them to reassert the fundamental teachings of the Qur’an and to resist 
the intrusion of Western influence in the Middle East.35 Their understanding is that the 
Shi’a are a centuries old minority within Islam, persecuted because of its special, 
revealed knowledge. This is coupled with an unswerving conviction that secular 
governments of all forms are illegitimate.36 Using this rationale, legitimate government 
can only be the result of adopting Islamic law in order to facilitate the return of the 
Prophet Mohammed to earth as the Messiah. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran 
has viewed itself as the stronghold of a transnational revolutionary movement.37 In 
general, Islamic terrorist groups are forced to maintain a focus on violent tactics used to 
pursue the goal of a global Islamic state.  
                                                          
34 Ibid., 96. 
35 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 96. 
36 Ibid. 
37  Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics, and Europe, 131. 
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The sense of alienation and of the necessity for far-reaching change in the world 
order is combined with the Shi’a perception of encirclement and concomitant predatory 
defensiveness. The violent nature of revolution is condoned by Islamic jihad, the holy 
war, against those who impose their illegitimate authority on the entire Muslim 
population.38 For most Islamic terrorist groups, their violence is justified by both Shi’a 
law and modern ideological concepts of the right to self defense. This leads to rhetoric 
casting the struggle as an all-out war from which there is no respite until the enemy is 
totally and utterly vanquished in order to ensure the safety of all Muslims. 
Islam is not unique in the violent symbols and mythology they portray. The fact 
is that the majority of religious traditions are filled with violent images and have violent 
histories. Religions are communities that have a tradition of sharing a particular point of 
view, a world view in which there is an essential conflict between appearance and a 
deeper reality. There is a hint that the deeper reality holds a degree of permanence and 
order quite unobtainable by secular means, as religious people tend to affirm.39 The 
conflict between the two is what religion is essentially about: images both of grave 
disorder and tranquil order, with hope that despite appearances to the contrary, order 
eventually will triumph, and disorder will be contained. This understanding of religion 
                                                          
38 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 97. 
39 Juergensmeyer. Inside Terrorist Organizations, 178. 
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posits no requirement of violence, however, religion must make sense of violence and 
incorporate it in some way into the world view it expresses.  
While many scholars assume that the French Revolution and regicide of Louis 
XVI differed in motive from other acts of political violence performed during the Wars 
of Religion this is not the case. The fusion of religious and secular components is far 
more characteristic of the rise of modern terrorism than the neatly posited boundary 
lines separating any secular trend from the religious motivations of the past.40 The 
decades following the French Revolution has seen the international system constantly 
redefining what it means to be a “citizen” and solidifying norms and laws promoting 
popular sovereignty as the foremost in legitimate authority.41 These ideological tenets 
are frequently coupled with religious doctrine in modern terrorist organizations as the 
basis for their legitimacy to act, each contributing to the overall sense of an important 
and irrefutable justification for political violence.  
The key to analysing terrorism, regardless of time period and type, is to focus on 
the fact that it is a response to a widespread perception of opportunity to create societal 
change in a historically unjust environment combined with a shift in a particular 
political or ideological paradigm.  While scholars seek to create categories and 
                                                          
40  Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 30. 
41 Ibid., 31. 
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summarize the actions of groups based on ideology or time period, terrorism tied to 
popular movements seeking greater democratic representation and political power 
from coercive empires has not ceased or changed dramatically. Rather, the promotion of 
global markets and shifts from ideologies focusing primarily on state centric criteria to 
those that promote the rights of individuals has increased the opportunities for terrorist 
groups to form and increase their longevity. 
The above applies to Hezbollah, though in a unique manner. Their Iranian 
inspired political program and desire for an Islamic Republic in Lebanon eventually 
gave way to a more pragmatic political strategy that saw their leadership opt for 
gradual engagement and integration, rather than violent confrontation, with the 
Lebanese political system. The reason for their creation was, and remains, resistance to 
Israeli occupation and aggression. What has changed since they were formed in late 
1984, however, is the relationship between their resistance activities and their socio-
political activities domestically and internationally. The facets influencing changes in 
this relationship will be what this thesis will analyze and aim to explain.  
1.3 Focus of Research and Research Questions 
The focus of this thesis was the result of my desire to explain how certain 
organizations that were created as a response to conflict successfully, or unsuccessfully, 
transform once that conflict has been resolved or mitigated. This meant that there was 
20 
 
an extremely diverse group of organizations that could have been the subject of this 
thesis. Ultimately, I chose to focus on the Lebanese group Hezbollah for several reasons. 
First, I wanted to focus on a group that is widely considered to be successful. Hezbollah 
has been almost uniquely efficient in areas across a broad range of criteria typically 
used to assess the success of terrorist organizations.42 Second, while other groups, such 
as Al-Qaeda, remain at the forefront of terrorist research post-9/11, Hezbollah is unique 
in that they represent a group that has gone through marked stages of transition in their 
tactics, organizational structure, ideology, and manner of addressing political 
concerns.43  The focal point of this is their participation in the Lebanese political system. 
Thus, Hezbollah offers a unique opportunity to analyze not only a successful terrorist 
organization, but one whose identity has shifted dramatically over its existence. 
This thesis argues that several internal organizational and external instrumental 
factors contributed to the political evolution of Hezbollah from an organization focused 
primarily on violent forms of political expression to an organization that primarily uses 
the parliamentary process. Examining Hezbollah's political transition in terms of its 
                                                          
42  This includes being categorized the “second most dangerous terrorist organization after Al Qaeda” as 
listed by the United States Government. Hezbollah has also achieved several of its stated goals, including the 
removal of American military forces in Lebanon and the removal of a substantial portion of the Israeli military 
forces in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah also exists in an exclusive group of terrorist organizations that have lasted 
longer than 10 years. It has also been accepted domestically and by a large amount of the international community 
as a legitimate political actor in Lebanon.  
43  Anisseh Van Engeland, “Hezbollah: from a Terrorist Group to a Political Party – Social Work as a Key to 
Politics,” From Terrorism to Politics, ed. Anisseh Van Engeland and Rachael M. Rudolph. (Oxford: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2008), 29. 
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instrumental and organizational dynamics exposes some of the weaknesses of 
conventional analytical approaches to studying terrorist organizations, and provides a 
more objective approach to understanding political violence.  
A cost v. benefit analysis is central to the instrumental approach I will be using in 
this thesis. The key elements in regards to Hezbollah that I will analyse include; the 
Lebanese Civil War, Syria’s influence in the unstable Lebanese political system, and the 
structure of the Ta’if Agreement that officially ended the Lebanese civil war. These are 
the main components I have identified in my research that most significantly impacted 
the environment where Hezbollah operates and forced them to make decisions 
regarding their method of political expression moving forward. 
The organizational approach is concerned with the interplay of relationships 
within the group itself. These include personal ambitions of the group’s members and 
leaders and how perceptions of a new direction for the organization affected the 
relationships between members and leaders. My research is focused specifically on how 
Hezbollah unified its leadership after adopting a more non-violent approach to political 
expression and how the organization consolidated support with both the radical and 
general elements of its membership. 
Combining the two approaches will demonstrate a clear understanding of how 
Hezbollah successfully made their ideological and political transition moving into the 
22 
 
1992 Lebanese parliamentary election. Further, I anticipate my approach to analysing 
this transition will offer insight into a larger discussion of concepts in regards to 
terrorist research, such as potential weaknesses in focused research on terrorist 
organizations that focus on identity in static terms. The terrorism as an identity versus 
terrorism as a tactic debate will be further discussed in the second chapter of this thesis.  
1.4 Importance of Research 
Although the literature on terrorism is abundant now, the distribution is 
extremely uneven. No subject in international relations commands more attention than 
counterterrorist policies does and this is no surprise. The interest in counterterrorism 
policies and recommendations, however, has not generated an equal interest in terrorist 
organizations themselves and the processes through which they come to structure 
themselves, or how they change that structure.  
Identifying and understanding the catalysts to Hezbollah’s organizational 
transformation is important for several reasons. First, if there are dynamics of 
Hezbollah’s transformation that are unique – or if this analysis provides further insight 
into future transformative trends by other groups – then an explanation as to how and 
why Hezbollah adapted non-violent forms of political expression is desirable. Second, 
as stated above the literature is heavily slanted toward investigating and explaining the 
how and why of the violence perpetrated by terrorist organizations. An analysis of how 
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one successful group transitioned to mostly non-violent actions has the potential to help 
fill gaps in the literature.  
1.5 Methodology and Shortcomings 
This thesis will be focused on a qualitative analysis of open-source materials of 
secondary data. These sources will include academic literature, media sources, books, 
reports, press releases, statements made by Western governments and their intelligence 
agencies, as well as statements and newsletters published by Hezbollah and its affiliate 
organizations. The controversial nature of the topic necessitates that whenever possible 
I will cross reference information from a variety sources. By thoroughly assessing both 
academic and partisan information I anticipate generating a clear picture of Hezbollah’s 
initial formation as a group in 1983, their ideological and strategic goals, and their 
transition as an organization, culminating with their participation in Lebanese 
parliament after the elections in 1992.  
 The nature of this research will necessitate a heavy reliance on partisan sources 
for statistics and information. Inconsistent and controversial definitions associated with 
studying international conflict can potentially influence the conclusions of information 
published by certain government and non-government organizations. For example, 
several government agencies in the United States define Hezbollah as a terrorist 
organization instead of state actor, despite the fact that Hezbollah holds a majority of 
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democratically elected seats in the Lebanese parliament. While many Western 
governments, including Germany and France, agree with the United States designation, 
a number of Muslim states affiliated with the Palestinian cause, notably Iran and Syria, 
advance that Hezbollah is in fact a resistance movement and not an armed militia or 
terrorist group. The following chapter will attempt to address these types of 
inconsistencies for the purpose of this research.  
 Whenever possible I will be attempting to use information that can be verified as 
coming directly from Hezbollah. It is important, however, to point out beforehand that 
while direct statements from the actors themselves offer unique perspectives, they must 
be treated cautiously. This is primarily due to the fact that literature and statements that 
are published by Hezbollah and their supporters may be suspect based on a variety of 
political and strategic motivations. Similarly, Western media sources often take a 
simplistic, ahistorical, and partisan view of Middle Eastern politics and social 
movements and must too be treated with some caution. In general, however, where 
correlation between the two sides does not exist I will consider information published 
within the academic community to be the most legitimate. 
1.6 Structure of Thesis 
The first two chapters are used to articulate the goals, methodology, and 
theoretical framework of the thesis. The second chapter specifically is devoted to the 
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theoretical framework I will use to analyze Hezbollah’s transition to a legitimate 
political party in Lebanon. Drawing on theoretical frameworks established by Martha 
Crenshaw, this chapter explains how I aim to combine both instrumental and 
organizational approaches to studying terrorism to analyze Hezbollah’s political 
transition. Furthermore it will identify key problems with definitions of terrorism, such 
as the pejorative nature of the term, and detail how this thesis will address those 
shortcomings in the proceeding chapters. 
In order to thoroughly analyze the evolution of Hezbollah as an organization it is 
imperative to understand the progression of the Lebanese political system and its 
influence in creating the conditions necessary for Hezbollah to emerge. Chapter 3 is 
structured around providing this historical framework and explaining how the 
progression of political sectarianism in Lebanon created the conditions that gave rise to 
Hezbollah.  
Having explained the historical and environmental conditions that gave rise to 
Hezbollah in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 aims to give a comprehensive look at Hezbollah’s 
ideological framework and how it affected the formation of the organization’s identity. 
Since their creation to present day, Hezbollah has insisted that first and foremost they 
are a resistance organization. Understanding how Hezbollah defines resistance, and 
incorporates this definition into their wider belief system, is directly related to how the 
26 
 
group navigated the organizational factors of their political transition. Chapter 4 
explores the core tenets of Hezbollah’s world view and seeks to specifically explain the 
role of resistance in Hezbollah’s ideology. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to the bulk of the analysis based on what has been 
examined in the four previous chapters. Here I will re-introduce the instrumental and 
organizational approaches discussed in Chapter 2 before seeking to apply them to the 
circumstances leading to, and culminating in, Hezbollah’s eventual transition into 
Lebanese politics in the 1992 election. Specifically, Hezbollah’s response the Syrian 
backed Ta’if Agreement and their organizational restructuring in response to changing 
political climate in Lebanon. Chapter 6, then, will provide a brief summary of this 
analysis before looking to answer some of the more general questions specified in this 
chapter, most importantly in regards to potential weaknesses in definitions and studies 
of terrorism in a larger sense, and my opinion on appropriate directions for further 
research. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
This thesis will draw on aspects of several theories and definitions of terrorism. 
The literature concerning terrorism today is heavily focused on explaining an 
individual or organizational justification for violent political expression. When 
examining the threat of terrorism, it is most often seen in terms of destructive 
capabilities rather than the complexity of issues that might guide such potential.44 This 
chapter will outline the limitations and benefits of two approaches to studying 
terrorism, explain how they will be combined and used as the theoretical foundation for 
this thesis, and address some of the current limitations in defining terrorism in 
academic literature. 
2.1 Theoretical Perspectives: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches  
In examining Hezbollah’s transition from violent to non-violent political 
expression, this thesis will draw on a combination of two basic explanations for how 
terrorist organizations behave as posited by Martha Crenshaw in Theories of Terrorism: 
Instrumental and Organizational Approaches.45 Below, this chapter will explore the benefits 
and limitations of both approaches in detail and explain how they will be combined in 
order to form the basis for the analysis in this thesis.  
                                                          
44  Crenshaw. Martha “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches” in Inside 
Terrorist Organizations ed. David C. Rapport (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 28. 
45  Ibid., 13. 
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The instrumental explanation is based on the assumption that the act of terrorism 
is a deliberate choice by a political actor. The goal of the organization is to influence 
radical changes in their political and social environments, therefore, they work together 
as a unit to achieve these collective values.46 Adopting this explanation leads us to 
interpret the actions of an organization as a response to external stimuli.  
The organizational explanation focuses on internal processes within the 
organization, or among organizations, sharing similar objectives. This view posits 
terrorism as a result of an organization’s struggle for survival in a competitive 
environment.47 The leadership of the organization ensures the survival of the group by 
offering varied incentives to members and potential followers, not all of which are 
congruent with the organization’s stated goals. In these cases the organization is 
responding to pressures from outside sources by changing the incentives they offer or 
through innovative processes.  
While both approaches are derived from established bodies of theory, neither of 
them can be used alone to sufficiently address the central questions of this thesis 
pertaining to why Hezbollah shifted from violent to non-violent forms of political 
expression. 
                                                          
46  Ibid., 28. 
47  Ibid. 
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2.2 Instrumental Approach  
 The instrumental approach to studying terrorism believes the actions of the 
organization, predominantly those violent in nature, are intentional. The actions of the 
parties involved, whether by the terrorist organization or government, are analyzed as 
if they were engaged in a typical conflict. They are an intentional exercise in a 
bargaining process between the two sides and aimed at influencing the behavior of the 
other. The organization using terrorism is attempting to produce a change in the 
government’s political position through violent coercion.48 Terrorist behavior, therefore, 
can be explained as entirely governed by an intentional cost versus benefit analysis 
used by the organization to calculate the benefit gained by their actions, the costs of the 
attempt and of its failure, the consequences of inaction, or the probability of success.49   
Accepting that organizations act intentionally based on a cost versus benefit 
scheme means that terrorist actions may occur based on a variety of reasons: the value 
sought is overwhelmingly important; the costs of trying are low; the status quo is 
intolerable; or the probability of succeeding is high.50 Ultimately this approach seeks to 
analyze and explain terrorist actions by focusing on the organization’s perceptions of 
incentive and opportunity. 
                                                          
48  Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 1-34. 
49  Crenshaw, Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches, 14. 
50  Ibid.  
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Identifying the existence of opportunities is crucial in this form of terrorism 
analysis. An organization may not consider translating its ideological goals into action 
until the possibility presents itself.51 These opportunities could stem from the 
vulnerability and availability of symbolic targets (such as the presence of American 
Marines in Beirut or the World Trade Center buildings in New York) or from resources 
acquired from foreign governments.52 Alternatively, a lack of opportunity can influence 
a group to attempt to create circumstances or an environment that may foster the 
necessary opportunities to act. 
This popular method of analyzing terrorism has had a significant influence on 
counterterrorism policy. A major weakness with the literature involving the 
instrumental approach, however, is that it is dominated by analysis centered on the 
opportunities for groups to pursue violent actions. The perceived benefits of an action, 
weighted against their apparent costs to the group, no doubt plays a significant role in 
determining the types of behavior an organization chooses to use in order to pursue 
their political goals. There is nothing that mandates, however, that such calculations will 
necessarily lead organizations to choose increasingly destructive types of behavior. 
Furthermore, if terrorism is a means to an end, then non-violent substitutes are possible 
if the correct circumstances present themselves. 
                                                          
51  Ibid. 
52  Ibid. 
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2.3 Organizational Approach 
 The organizational approach to studying terrorist actions focuses on the internal 
politics of the organization. It suggests that terrorism can become a sustained method of 
political expression regardless of its political consequences and assumes the 
fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself.53 Rather than 
strategic action based on opportunity and consequences, terrorist behavior represents 
the outcome of the internal dynamics of the organization. This means that the personal 
ambitions of members, particularly those in leadership roles, are important when 
analyzing an organization’s viability and political position. The Organizational 
approach assumes a complexity of motivation that goes beyond the cost versus benefit 
analysis involved in order to communicate a political message. The leadership struggles 
as much to maintain the viability of the organization by developing a system of 
incentives for their members as they do to challenge governments. 
Providing incentives for an organization’s members is crucial for the group’s 
survival. The relationship between actual rewards for membership and the 
organization’s stated objectives, however, is rarely straight forward.54 Recruits who join 
an organization may do so for reasons other than ideology. In order to retain their 
position, leaders must supply various tangible and intangible incentives to members 
                                                          
53  Ibid., 15. 
54  Crenshaw, Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches, 19. 
32 
 
that satisfy their alternative reasons for joining and remaining part of the organization. 
The popular image of the terrorist as an individual motivated exclusively by deep and 
inflexible political commitment obscures a more complex reality. 
Individuals respond to a variety of incentives awarded by leaders to participate 
in terrorist organizations. This begs the question, what incentives are most common and 
most effective? Jessica Stern is one of a handful of authors that attempts to address this 
in her book, Terror in the Name of God. She suggests that the incentives received by 
members are partly spiritual, partly emotional, and partly material.55 Leaders can 
encourage operatives to participate in violent forms of political expression by promising 
heavenly rewards or threatening heavenly retribution. Stern also points to cash 
payments for successful operations, offered to the member themselves or to their 
families, as a powerful incentive used by leaders.56 Crenshaw also points to a variety of 
individual needs that leaders must satisfy citing “the need to belong to a group, to 
acquire social status and reputation, to find comradeship or excitement, or to gain 
material benefits” as some of the incentives terrorist organizations can provide 
members.57 It stands to reason that successful organizations will be those that are 
capable of appealing to broad groups of individuals by offering a mixture of incentives 
to their members. 
                                                          
55  Jessica Stern, Terror in the Mind of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Ecco Press, 2003), 3. 
56  Ibid., 4. 
57  Crenshaw, Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches, 19. 
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Beyond incentives that appeal directly to individuals, there are incentives that 
appeal to members collectively as part of the organization. Collective goals appeal to the 
individual’s sense of satisfaction by contributing to a worthy political cause. These 
purposive incentives are a major influence on not only the organization’s efficiency, but 
also on their stability and capacity to survive. James Q. Wilson identifies three different 
categories of political purpose that affect the stability of the organization, two of which 
are important for this thesis.58 The first are ideological incentives based on beliefs that 
constitute a systematic, comprehensive rejection of the present political world and the 
promise of creating a future replacement. These incentives are most often observed in 
the wave of revolutionary terrorist organizations discussed in the first chapter and 
especially apply to Hezbollah during their formative period. The second type of 
incentive is based on the appeal of organizations whose efforts concentrate primarily on 
changing the lives of their members. Groups that subscribe to the second form of 
incentive are likely to focus on self-sacrifice, on living by stringent moral codes, or on 
conversion.59 Both forms of incentives suggest that group stability will be heavily 
influenced by the ideological focus of the organization and skillful leadership who can 
create and manipulate various incentives to attract and keep members.  
                                                          
58  James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) 
59  Wilson suggests that since such groups can never succeed, their despair often results in extreme 
destructiveness and willingness to take risks. Hezbollah’s transition into Lebanese politics and other forms of non-
violent political expression directly challenges this conclusion. 
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2.4 The “Fight Harder” Hypothesis 
 Accepting that the leaders of a terrorist group view the organization’s stability 
and survival as primarily important is congruent with another general theory of 
organizational behavior that focuses on the prevention of decline in firms. The 
immediate objective for firms and terrorist organizations is to continue operations.60 
Along with incentives, leaders attempt to inhibit members from leaving the 
organization. This is most often done in terrorist organizations by establishing what 
Albert O. Hirschman terms “severe initiation costs”.61 By imposing a high cost for 
entrance into the organization, individuals who invest develop a certain stake in self-
deception. This inevitably leads members to “fight hard to prove they were right after 
all in paying that high entrance fee” rather than admit error.62 This does not imply, 
however, that the “Fight Harder” hypothesis is suggesting the dissatisfied terrorist will 
necessarily commit to a renewed focus and pursuit of violent political expression. 
Rather, dissatisfied members may influence changing the organization’s political 
direction. When members of a terrorist group lack the possibility of exit and are 
intensely loyal, the leaders of the organization may have to use a form of creative 
innovation to ensure the group’s stability.  
                                                          
60  Crenshaw, Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches, 22. 
61  Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 93. 
62  Ibid. 
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 Policy recommendations based on the organizational approach are difficult to 
implement, slow to mature, and have few results that can be displayed to the public 
because of their emphasis on secrecy and deception.63 This may be why the 
organizational approach is less popular in the literature, but this does not mean it is less 
valuable. The organizational approach allows us not only to examine the incentive 
structures and competitiveness of groups, but also to capture internal and external 
interactions that can help explain the “how” and “why” of terrorist behavior.  
2.5 Combining the Approaches 
Terrorism is often conveniently fitted into a familiar spectrum of international 
conflict and national security threats both by scholars and policy makers. This has 
influenced most theories to focus on the response to terrorism rather than the problem 
itself. The instrumental approach is attractive because we can see results and it makes 
us feel empowered when applying it to policy recommendations. Using the logical rules 
of a cost versus benefit analysis is applicable in some fashion to all choices made by 
individuals to some degree. The relatively undemanding information requirements also 
apply to all manner of conflict regardless of the identity of actors involved. In real life, 
however, people have mixed motives for everything they do. Individual desires, for 
recognition or rewards, by God or other people, may influence the behavior of terrorist 
                                                          
63  Crenshaw, Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches, 29. 
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organizations as much as pragmatic incentives, such as money for themselves or their 
families. The instrumental approach may sufficiently answer the “if” and “when” 
questions concerning terrorist behavior, but equally important for this thesis will be 
using an approach that can incorporate variables in an attempt to answer questions 
concerning the “how” and “why” of terrorist behavior. Combining these two 
approaches will help us explain both the emotional elements that can influence an 
organization’s willingness to participate in terrorism as well as the logical elements that 
play a role in crafting a strategy that may include a transition away from violent 
ideology. 
2.6 Problems Defining Terrorism 
Finally, a significant problem for scholars attempting to study and contribute to 
the literature regarding terrorism is establishing a working definition for the term itself. 
The student of terrorism is confronted with hundreds of definitions in the literature.64 
Some of these definitions focus on the perpetrator, on the individual’s purpose, and 
others on the techniques used. Two main problems exist when attempting to define 
terrorism; the first is that across the literature there is a glaring inconsistency in the 
                                                          
64  Stern, Terror in the Mind of God, 15. 
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criteria, and the second is that the pejorative nature in which the word is typically used 
causes instantaneous bias and limits the legitimacy of any consensus.65  
The taboo associated with the word terrorism is so powerful that different 
definitions unavoidably produce different political consequences. For example, if 
illegality is used as a criterion for behavior that is considered terrorism, analysis would 
be slanted towards camouflaging state terrorism and thereby excessively focus on 
opponents of states. If the non-combatant status of the targets is used as the main 
criteria for identifying terrorism it casts states as the primary perpetrators, primarily 
because their armies operate on a larger scale and usually kill, injure, or terrorize many 
more civilians than even the most destructive non-state terrorist groups. 
Understanding terrorism is particularly difficult because the term has come to 
mean many things to many people. The diversity of national perspectives on any single 
group or event makes the task of creating the international consensus necessary to 
establish a definition of terrorism that is widely acceptable nearly impossible. Below are 
distinctly different definitions used by two of the leading law enforcement agencies in 
the United States. The Federal Bureau of Investigation uses the following on their 
website to define terrorism: 
                                                          
65   For more in-depth analysis on challenges facing terrorism research, including defining terrorism and units 
of measurement etc., see: Joseph K. Young and Michael G. Findley, “Promise and Pitfalls of Terrorism Research” in 
International Studies Review, Vol. 13, 411-431, (2011).  
38 
 
 Terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as “the unlawful use of force 
and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the 
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social 
objectives” (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85). The FBI further describes terrorism as either 
domestic or international, depending on the origin, base, and objectives of the terrorist 
organization. For the purpose of this report, the FBI will use the following definitions: 
 Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a 
group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico 
without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce 
a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political 
or social objectives.  
 International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a 
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state. 
These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence 
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a 
government by assassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside the 
United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are 
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in 
which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum66 
The Central Intelligence Agency, however, refers to the following on their website in 
regards to how they define terrorism: 
The Intelligence Community is guided by the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of 
the US Code, Section 2656f(d): 
 The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.  
 
 The term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving the territory or the 
citizens of more than one country. 
                                                          
66 FBI, Definitions of Terrorism in the U.S. Code, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition 
39 
 
 The term “terrorist group” means any group that practices, or has significant subgroups 
that practice, international terrorism.67 
While similarities exist between the definitions, the fact that two departments working 
for the same government use different characteristics to describe terrorism shows the 
difficulty in crafting a universal approach to defining terrorism. 
Academics also struggle with creating a working definition of terrorism.68 Stern 
indicates that only two characteristics of terrorism are critical to distinguish it from 
other forms of violence; it is aimed at non-combatants and the violence is for the 
dramatic purpose of instilling fear in the target audience.69 Adam Dolnik, whose book 
Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends aims to explain 
how terrorists use “tactical and technological innovations” in order to become more 
dangerous, defines terrorism as “the use or threat of use of anxiety inducing, 
extranormal violence for political purposes by any individual, or group, when such 
action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than 
the immediate victims”.70 Last, Noam Chomsky a leading scholar uses several 
definitions he argues are acceptable including “the calculated use of violence or threat 
                                                          
67 CIA, Terrrorism FAQs, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/terrorism-
faqs.html 
68   The issues defining terrorism are not exclusive to any single discipline of academic research. For an 
interdisciplinary approach to defining terrorism see: Lanier Burns, “Toward a Contemporary Definition of 
Terrorism” in Forum on Public Policy: A Journal of the Oxford Round Table, Fall, 1-29, (2011). 
69  Stern, Terror in the Mind of God, 16. 
70  Adam Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics, and Global Trends (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 4. 
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of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature…through 
intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear”.71 Stern’s definition focuses on non-combatants 
and the use of fear, ignoring that physical destruction can very well be the focus and 
intent of terrorist groups.72 Dolnik’s version includes extranormal violence as a 
characteristic in order to limit his definition to non-state actors.73 Finally, Chomsky’s 
definition is the most inclusive of the three, allowing for state actors and all forms of 
violence against a variety of targets, but is met with the most resistance because it 
inevitably leads to the conclusion that states have been the primary perpetrators of 
terrorism. 
Even when consensus on certain characteristics of terrorism can be reached, their 
inconsistent use by those contributing to the literature poses another problem when 
forming a comprehensive definition of terrorism. For example, many definitions 
consider terrorism something that is only targeted at non-combatants but even that 
term is controversial. A clearly marked soldier on a battlefield is unquestionably a 
combatant, but what if their country is not at war and the soldier is in a military 
housing complex? What if the soldier is in a transport that is also carrying a number of 
civilians? What about those working at the Department of Defense in the Pentagon 
                                                          
71  Noam Chomsky, “Terrorism: American Style” World Policy Journal, 24.1 (2007), 44. 
72  For a more in-depth look at apocalyptic terrorism see Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 121-129. 
73  Dolnik defines extranormal violence to be “violent actions other than traditional state conflict” 
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when it was attacked by Al-Qaeda operatives on September 11th, 2001? These are just a 
handful of the problematic situations that exist when using only one of the typical 
characteristics used to define terrorism. As more characteristics are fleshed out, the 
problem of using them consistently grows exponentially.74  
The pejorative nature of term, often used in the rhetoric used to denounce the 
actions of certain organizations politically, is at least partially at fault for the difficulty of 
defining terrorism. By using Chomsky’s definition cited above it leads us to the 
unacceptable conclusion that certain states have successfully used terrorism more than 
even the most notorious groups recognized internationally as terrorist organizations. 
This conclusion would obviously be rejected by the majority of western policy makers 
and a significant number of scholars, leading many students of terrorism to abandon 
the effort of creating a working definition because it may simply be too difficult.75 The 
personal attachment of individuals who use the term to describe something “wrong” 
highlights an underlying issue when using terrorism to describe political violence: it 
necessitates a dichotomy between those describing and those being described. Crafting 
a definition of terror that applies solely to the terror that “they” carry out against “us 
                                                          
74   For analysis on how problems defining terrorism directly relate to Hezbollah see: Mona Harb and Reinoud 
Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, ‘terrorism’ and the politics of perception” in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 
26, No. 1, 173-197, (2005). 
75   For challenges defining terrorism both pre and post 9/11 see: Upendra D. Acharya, “War on Terror or 
Terror Wars: The Problem in Defining Terrorism” in Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 37, No. 4, 
653-670, (2009). 
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and our clients”, but excludes the terror that “we and our clients” carry out against 
them is impossible to do rationally. Examining western foreign policy over the last one 
hundred years when discussing terrorism displays a rejection of a basic moral principle: 
that we apply to ourselves the same standards we do to others, if not more stringent 
ones.76 Acceptable definitions of the terms do become an extremely difficult matter, not 
because the facts are unclear, rather because they are very clear and reach the wrong 
conclusions.  
Difficulties adequately describing terrorism are unlikely to be resolved any time 
soon. Discussion regarding the key issues was included in this chapter to facilitate 
several key points. First, while the primary goal of this thesis is to analyze Hezbollah’s 
transition from violent to non-violent forms of political expression, acknowledging that 
Hezbollah has been labeled a terrorist group is not a point of contention in my research. 
Whether or not this label is appropriate has no bearing on explaining how and why the 
organization evolved. Second, in refusing to address their widely contested label as 
terrorists, this thesis is not making an argument to support or discredit either side of the 
argument. Last, highlighting the difficulties inherent to establishing a working 
definition of terrorism was meant to justify why beyond this chapter this thesis will 
mention terrorism sparingly, if at all. The key to this research is the relationship 
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between Hezbollah’s objectives, their process for deciding how best to pursue said 
objectives, and the influence organizational and instrumental factors had in this 
process. Attempting to establish a comprehensive definition of terrorism inevitably will 
shift the focus away from the main purpose of this thesis – analyzing how and why 
Hezbollah moved from violent to non-violent forms of political expression. 
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Chapter 3: A Brief History of theLebanese Political 
System and the Founding of Hezbollah 
The distribution of power and authority in Lebanese government is based almost 
entirely on a sectarian formula that is meant to arrange a balanced representation 
between Christian and Muslim Lebanese in parliamentary positions. In the Lebanese 
parliament, for example, the President is always a Maronite Christian, the Prime 
Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker a Shi’a Muslim, and so on in an effort to divide 
influence equally betwixt the groups.77 Attempts to balance the distribution of political 
authority in any system are not without challenges. Uniquely prominent to sectarian 
systems, however, is how they create, shape, and reinforce exclusivist identities among 
many individuals. Historically in Lebanon this has significantly hindered the 
development of strong, cohesive, cross-communal linkages within the country.78 The 
focus, however, is not the debilitating impact sectarianism has on national governance 
and the authority of national institutions, but rather with asking how communal 
groups, such as Hezbollah, acquire legitimacy and authority vis-à-vis their main 
constituency, in this case, the Shi’a of Lebanon. 
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The following is not meant to be an exhaustive look at the history of Lebanon 
and its political system, but instead is focused on identifying key aspects of the 
country’s history and the geopolitical, cultural, and religious influences that created an 
environment for Hezbollah’s creation. In order to complete a thorough analysis of the 
relationship between the organizational and instrumental influences on the 
transformation of Hezbollah’s political expression, it is necessary to understand 
geopolitical and historical factors that shaped these influences and the relationship of 
Hezbollah’s creation as a response. The history of the political system in Lebanon 
directly relates to my thesis because it defines the environment where Hezbollah 
functions and allows us to understand significant influences on the organization’s 
methods of operation.  This chapter is structured around explaining how regional 
differences contributed to political sectarianism in Lebanese government structures, 
how those structures influence the distribution of political-economic authority through 
constitutional and intra-communal mechanisms, and how those conditions enable a 
group such as Hezbollah to be formed in Lebanon. 
3.1 Brief Geopolitical History of Lebanon: Ottoman Empire to Constitutional 
Independence  
Modern Lebanon, found on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, is a small 
republic that stretches approximately 4,036 square miles and hosts a population of 
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nearly five million.79 Between 1516 and 1918 the territory fell under Ottoman 
sovereignty and officially was divided into two regions. A northern region formed part 
of the province of Tripoli, and a southern region forming part of the province of Sidon.80 
In 1864 these regions were redefined. The province of Beirut absorbed the territories of 
both Tripoli and Sidon, while the Biqa in northern Lebanon was absorbed by the 
province of Damascus.81 The communal differences between the groups were 
predominantly religious in nature and were dominated theologically by Christian, 
Islamic, and, to a lesser extent, Jewish faiths. The religious and cultural diversity of the 
region created significant barriers to dividing geographical provinces, government 
influence, and establishing a functional political system in the country. 
Ottoman subjects were divided along the religiously based distinction codified in 
the millet system82, which established a two-tier hierarchy between the higher 
community, made up of Muslims, and a lower community that paid a ‘protection tax’, 
the Christians and Jews.83 The sectarian division of these groups had a distinct 
implication on the social division of labour in Lebanon. Christians and Jews tended to 
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specialize in commerce, finance, and handicrafts. By contrast, the labour of the Muslim 
community was focused on roles associated with administration and tribal-warrior 
functions.84 This uneven distribution is important to note because, as Lebanon evolved 
as a nation state over the next two centuries, social and political conflicts that were 
largely economic in nature were ultimately transformed into sectarian conflicts.85 These 
conflicts would continue to persist after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and be 
further instigated by the French census and division of government institutions 
amongst the groups by French authorities in the Mandate Era. 
After France was declared the Mandate Authority over Lebanon, political 
authority began to be distributed across a wider range of actors at the central and local 
levels of government. On August 31, 1920, the French Mandatory Authorities officially 
created Greater Lebanon, separating the state from Syria and expanding their borders to 
include the Shi’a-populated areas of the South and the Biqa.86 Similar to other eastern 
Arab states, such as Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Iraq, modern Lebanon’s borders were 
created as part of the partition process between Paris and London of the ex-Ottoman 
Empire and imposed against the will of the majority of its population.87 Lebanese 
Christians had called for expansion and distinct separation from the rest of Syria, 
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strongly desiring some form of French protection. By 1926, Greater Lebanon had been 
declared a Republic and its modern day borders defined.88 The new Republic brought 
under its authority the diverse range of communities in the area.89 The Mandate 
Authority, in response, based their institutions on sectarian divisions as a response to 
the pluralities they inherited.   
Many Lebanese in 1926 would have had more familiarity, socio-cultural affinity, 
and economic ties with areas that were declared part of Palestine or Syria then they 
would with their co-nationalists.90 In response to the pluralities inherited by the French, 
parliament was created on the basis of sectarian representation, with each community 
promised parliamentary positions and influence in the new Lebanese Republic.91 
Despite the veneer of equality seemingly provided by the new parliament, the 
constitution was drafted in a manner that ensured Maronite hegemony under French 
protection. The Maronite Christians welcomed the French presence as a means to 
guarantee their prominence in a heavily populated Muslim region and France 
reciprocated this loyalty in how they shaped the institutions of Lebanese government. 
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The French constructed the Lebanese government in a way that concentrated 
authority in positions reserved for Maronite Christians. For example, the system 
apportioned seats between Maronite Christians and Muslims in a 6 to 5 ratio, one that 
was proportionate to the population sizes at that time.92 Similarly, the position of 
President, the most powerful position in Lebanese parliament, could only be filled by a 
Maronite Christian.93 This increasingly raised the ire of the other, specifically Muslim, 
groups. As the official authority in Lebanon, the French had to placate these groups in 
order to maintain order in the region. They did so by creating linkages between sects, or 
regions, to the central state through posts in parliament.94 These communal linkages had 
long-term consequences on the ways in which individuals and groups can express 
themselves politically in Lebanon. Unlike Western democratic states, expression of 
political agency in Lebanon is not determined by citizenship but rather by membership 
in a sectarian community.95 This further creates and shapes exclusivist identities within 
groups in Lebanon and promotes the reinforcement of sectarian value systems in the 
population. Even though the division of influence and representation in parliament was 
not equal, the system itself promoted the line of reasoning that every group had the 
ability to participate based on sectarian linkages and nothing else. 
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Regardless of the inequality of the division of power in the Lebanese parliament, 
this was the beginning of a new relationship between the Shi’a population and the 
Lebanese state. For the first time, there was a political interest on the part of the Shi’a 
leadership in the existence of an independent Lebanese entity based on the guaranteed 
proportional representation of different religious communities.96 The Shi’a 
representatives of the Lebanese Chamber refused to support the Arab nationalist call for 
unity between Lebanon and Syria, stating that a separate Lebanon was the only 
circumstance in which they would have an opportunity to play a prominent role in the 
political system.97 This was reinforced by the creation of a Ja’fari madhab (school of 
jurisprudence) in 1926. These courts were the first Shi’a institution to enjoy communal 
autonomy granted by the state and were responsible for adjudicating on matters of 
personal status, such as divorce or inheritance, using Shi’a law. The Shi’a population 
was increasingly included in the bureaucratization of Lebanese government. Coupling 
that with the practice of Shi’a law in these courts and a new kind of Shi’a sectarianism 
was beginning to form in Mandate-era Lebanese institutions. 
The defining compromise of Lebanese politics was the mithaq al-watani or 
National Pact, an unwritten understanding between the dominant political 
communities – the Sunni Muslims and the Maronite Christians – that would provide the 
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terms of reference for Lebanon’s independence. Similar to the creation of past 
institutions throughout Lebanese history, various offices of state were portioned out to 
the communities. For the first time, however, the Shi’a population was officially 
included in the allocation of Lebanese parliamentary positions in the form of the 
speakership of the Chamber of Deputies.98 Appropriating this significant government 
position to the Shi’a allowed them to officially participate in Lebanese parliament and 
competition over it was fierce amongst the leading families in the community.  
Throughout the Ottoman Empire and Mandate Era of Lebanese history there has 
been a constant struggle between the diverse cultural groups in the region, but also 
between the region as a whole and those with authority over it. The response to these 
theological and cultural differences has been a sectarian system that often left the Shi’a 
marginalized, under represented, and disenfranchised. The creation of the courts and 
Shi’a specific positions suggest important patterns of communal differentiation that are 
relevant to our understanding of sectarianism in Lebanon and its influence on the 
creation of Hezbollah. First among these relationships is the distinct sectarian links of 
citizens to the state. A citizen’s relationship to the state is one that passes directly 
through their sectarian affiliation in Lebanon. This inevitably leads to patterns of 
differentiation that foster exclusion from both the state and other sects. The second, and 
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more important, is the influence of these links on creating possibilities for specific 
communal identities to develop as related to institutional and political differentiations. 
The institutional structure of the Mandate state reinforced and consolidated the 
authority of the clerical classes, contributed to their growth in authority, and allowed 
them an institutional setting through which to govern over the lives of the community 
beyond their places of worship. Each community in Lebanon further entrenched 
themselves within their own viewpoints while simultaneously connecting to their 
identity of the state. This developing power structure would set the stage for increased 
political activism and eventually civil war. 
3.2 Mobilization of the Shi’a in Lebanon and Musa al-Sadr 
Even though the Shi’a were formally recognized in the National Pact, granted 
access to the Lebanese political system, and were beginning to develop political links 
between the state and their communities, the Shi’a population at large suffered from 
gross neglect and discrimination by the machinery of the state. The majority of the 
population was consolidated in the south, where sickness, illiteracy, poverty, and thirst 
were common place.99 The socio-economic turmoil in these communities in comparison 
to other regions in Lebanon, coupled with Shi’a under representation in parliament, and 
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thus inability to create change, would eventually lead to a mass migration to urban 
centres and a strengthening demand for a more politically active Shi’a community. 
The Lebanese economy began to strengthen during these years of mobilization, 
with many Shi’a moving to Beirut, a city that had become the centerpiece of Lebanese 
wealth and consumption. Yet, for the Shi’a living in both rural and urban areas of 
Lebanon the income disparities were growing. In 1971, the average Shi’a family income 
was 4,532 Lebanese pounds, in comparison to the national average of 6,247 Lebanese 
pounds, and constituted the highest percentage of families earning less than 1,500 
Lebanese pounds at twenty two percent.100 According to every indicator, the Shi’a were 
at the very bottom of the socio-economic ladder.101 In the end, the effect of Shi’a 
migration to urban centers was a growing awareness of the inequities of Lebanese 
society, not only in urban centers like Beirut, but also in the South where the Palestinian 
organizations were based.102 This awareness would eventually translate into political 
mobilization in the Shi’a community. 
The socio-economic changes resulting from the mass migration of Lebanese to 
urban centers and new government institutions was translated only gradually into 
political mobilization in the Shi’a community. The Shi’a community lacked a genuinely 
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participatory political tradition.103 While the other religious communities in Lebanon 
were represented by their respective political parties, there was no Shi’a political party 
that articulated Shi’a grievances as their primary concern. In the absence of a Shi’a 
party, young Shi’a started to fill the ranks of the Leftist and radical parties, such as the 
Lebanese Community Party and Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party. 104 As a group, the 
Shi’a in Lebanon remained politically disorganized and inefficient, lacking 
representation that could be defined as specifically Shi’a. 
Though the Shi’a population had begun to mobilize around issues of socio-
economic deprivation they still lacked the coordinated structure and political 
organization through which to do so as Shi’a. This mobilization would drastically 
change when Musa al’Sadr, an Iranian cleric of Lebanese descent, became the mufi 
(religious judge/authority) of the city Tyre, the only major city in Lebanon where the 
Shi’a formed a majority.105 His goals in Lebanon were to improve the material 
conditions of the Lebanese Shi’a, to shield them from Israeli aggression, provide 
support for the Palestinian cause, and anti-Shah activism.106 While much can be said 
about al-Sadr’s time in Lebanon, the most important element pertaining to our 
discussion was his ability to organize the Shi’a population politically. The first step he 
                                                          
103 Ibid., 196. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Abboud and Muller, Rethinking Hizballah, 26.  
106 Ibid., 27. 
55 
 
took in doing so was to establish a Shi’a religious council which would enjoy official 
recognition similar to that of the council in the other Lebanese communities. While the 
French decree in 1926 had authorized the establishment of Shi’a religious courts, it was 
not until 1967 that the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies approved the establishment of 
the Supreme Islamic Shi’a Council (SISC), due in large part to the political maneuvering 
of al-Sadr.107 On May 18, 1969, al-Sadr was elected Chairman, a post he occupied until 
his disappearance in 1978 and used to advance his claim to lead the entire community. 
Following the official recognition of the SISC, al-Sadr continued to successfully 
rally the Lebanese Shi’a politically to his cause through his appeal to both traditional 
Shi’a symbolism and to a pluralistic and inter-communal image of Lebanon. In 1974 Al-
Sadr founded the Harakat al-Mahrumin (Movement of the Deprived), which created in 
1975 a military wing called Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya (Lebanese Resistance 
Detachments). The two groups eventually fused together to become a political party 
known as Amal (The Movement of Hope). This marked two important steps for the 
Shi’a in Lebanon. First, establishing a sectarian militia made it implicitly clear that 
armed struggle was a viable means to achieving political gains. The first political party 
with specifically Shi’a interests and leadership was founded on ideological principles 
that focused on armed resistance. Unsurprisingly Shi’a organizations in Lebanon, 
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including Hezbollah, have made armed resistance part of how they justify their 
existence. Second, by expanding the courts recognition to include the SISC, the Shi’a 
community was linked to the state in new ways that fostered the development of 
specifically Shi’a sectarian identities.108 This was accomplished by institutionalizing 
Shi’ism in Lebanon through the creation of legal space for Shi’a to advocate for their 
individual rights in accordance with their own legal and religious practices that was 
equal to other sects. That in turn promoted a sense of citizenship and political stake in 
Lebanon within the Shi’a community. Shi’a participation in both violent and non-
violent expressions of political self-determination would continue to gain momentum 
through the civil war and play a major role in influencing the emergence of Hezbollah.  
3.3 The Lebanese Civil War and Israeli Invasion of Lebanon 
The civil war (1975-1989) was the immediate context in which Hezbollah was 
borne. The collapse of, and inflexibility in light of demographic changes, post-1943 
authority sharing agreements created an environment where many communities felt 
socio-economic exclusion from the post-independence growth in Lebanon. The 
outbreak of civil war in Lebanon in 1975 served to elevate the suffering of Lebanese 
Shi’a already caught in the middle of the Palestinian resistance fighters and the Israelis. 
While various groups participated in the violence, the conflict was primarily between 
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two broad camps: the Phalange Party and its mainly Christian allies in the Lebanese 
Front (LF) and the Palestinian and mainly Muslim groups allied under the umbrella of 
the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). In an attempt to eliminate the Palestinian 
threat Israel also invaded Lebanon in 1978, then again in 1982, while simultaneously 
sponsoring the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) who served as their proxy force in the 
Southern occupation zone and participated heavily in the fighting. The conflict between 
these interconnected groups served to seriously compound Shi’a suffering and increase 
their demands for representation and resistance to the Israeli occupation.  
The ongoing conflict increased the suffering of the Shi’a population, especially in 
southern Lebanon. A large portion of the Shi’a population associated their struggles to 
those of the Palestinians, cooperating with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
guerilla forces in the region. A year into the civil war, over 100,000 Shi’a were driven 
from their homes in south Lebanon, and by 1977 an Israeli-backed Lebanese militia 
purposely targeted Shi’a villages in the south as retaliation for their support of 
Palestinian fighters.109 The constant Israeli aggression, focused primarily on eliminating 
the Palestinian guerilla presence in the south, served only to aggravate the civil war.  
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In 1978, Israel initiated Operation Litani, invading Lebanese territory and forcing 
Palestinian guerillas north of the Litani River.110 The attack killed thousands of 
Palestinian and Lebanese, both fighters and civilians, and established an Israeli 
occupation zone from Lebanon’s southern border up to the Litani.111 The hostile 
Palestinian military presence in towns and cities, and interference in people’s daily 
lives, resulted in clashes and an attitude of aversion from the Shi’a population in 
southern Lebanon.112 The civil war was unraveling in Lebanon while a regional army 
occupied its southern territory and a guerilla force was displaced into the general 
population. Arguably, no group suffered more from these factors than the Shi’a in 
Lebanon which led to unrest in the population and resentment towards not only Israel, 
but also the Palestinian forces. 
In response to the Israeli occupation the United Nations Security Council drafted 
Resolutions 425 and 426, pressing Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory and allow 
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to take up positions between the 
border and the Litani.113 The Israeli military did end up withdrawing from the region, 
but not before establishing a military relationship with the South Lebanon Army (SLA) 
in an attempt to eliminate any military activity against Israel. The general disdain by the 
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Shi’a in southern Lebanon for the Palestinian military presence led Israel to assume that 
armed resistance to another invasion would be minimal and not supported by the 
civilian population.114  
Even after their withdrawal, Israel remained poised to assault, and retaliate 
against, Palestinian forces in Lebanon. Both the SLA and UNIFIL proved incapable of 
preventing Palestinian guerilla attacks into northern Israel. Tensions increased on both 
sides until July 3rd, 1982, when the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom survived 
an attack in front of London’s Dorchester Hotel.115 On July 4, 1982, Israel announced that 
the attack constituted a breach of the ceasefire accord with the PLO from 1981 and 
justified their second invasion of south Lebanon, moving passed the Litani towards 
Beirut’s southern border, to eliminate Palestinian targets.116 This occupation would 
encompass well over fifty percent of Lebanon’s land mass. The second Israeli invasion 
and its subsequent occupation would come to represent the moment that accelerated 
the emergence of Hezbollah, a new religious based resistance movement with Shi’a 
Islam as its ideological inspiration, and the Iranian revolution as its political 
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inspiration.117 By occupying Lebanon rather than promptly withdrawing after their 
offensive, Israel provided conditions for Hezbollah to grow. 
The civil war directly encouraged a period of conviction for transition among the 
Shi’a in Lebanon. This led to the resurgence in popular support for Amal among the 
Shi’a of southern Lebanon, particularly after the example set by the Shi’a-led Islamic 
Revolution in Iran in 1978-79.118 During this period Amal struggled to consolidate its 
hierarchy and organizational structure in the face of ideological currents and 
disagreements among its leadership.119 The most agreed upon tenets of their 
organization were disdain for the zu’ama (political bosses), who had traditionally 
dominated Shi’a society, anger toward the Palestinian guerillas and their allies, and 
lastly, hatred toward Israel after their occupation had overstayed its welcome in 
southern Lebanon. Still, though Amal saw a period of resurgence during the Lebanese 
civil war their inability to consolidate their leadership and political focus led to 
demands for an alternative representative organization for the Shi’a in Lebanon, 
demands that would be fulfilled by the formation of Hezbollah.  
Prior to Hezbollah’s official formation in 1985 a number of smaller Islamist-
oriented groups, independent activists, Islamic clerics, and former leaders and officials 
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who had left Amal, joined ranks to establish Hezbollah as a unified Islamist 
movement.120 Hezbollah lacked the kind of institutional structure and depth (discussed 
at length in chapter 5) in their formative years that would characterize it later on. The 
founders were a collection of activists who had been involved in secular and sectarian 
politics in the previous generation.  These men were unified in that they were young, 
revolutionary, Islamist-oriented, and committed to overthrowing Israeli occupation.121 
They were the alternative representation for the Shi’a population in Lebanon to Amal, 
rejecting compromise with the Lebanese political system they blamed for Shi’a 
exclusion in the first place. Combined with demands of the Shi’a population for a 
response to Israeli aggression and occupation, the creation of Hezbollah, or a group 
with a similar focus and structure to it, was inevitable.   
3.4 Hezbollah and Amal 
It was during this period that Hezbollah moved aggressively to strike at 
Westerners in Lebanon and at Western influence, promoting increased violent 
resistance in the region. Groups linked to Hezbollah, if not directly controlled by the 
party, kidnapped dozens of foreigners and held them hostage for as long as seven years 
(as was the case of American journalist Terry Anderson).122 This was predated by the 
bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983, an attack that Hezbollah has often been 
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linked to by Western security agencies but that the organization has never explicitly 
taken credit for.123 Regardless of their participation in the Embassy bombing, two things 
are undoubtedly clear about the period from 1981 to Hezbollah’s official formation in 
1985. First, violent attacks against Western representatives, including bombings, 
kidnappings, and assassinations, saw a marked increase.124 Second, Hezbollah was 
without question linked to these resistance and anti-Western violent attacks.125 While 
many scholars are quick to point towards Iranian influences for the attacks, there are 
instances where Hezbollah’s role is clearly indicated. Hezbollah’s early hard-nosed 
stance in support of resistance activity increased tension with Western powers, 
specifically Israel and the United States, but equally importantly promoted violent 
resistance in the Shi’a population who sought a pro-active alternative to Amal. 
While some of the more destructive attacks in Lebanon during this period are 
debatably connected to Hezbollah, the evidence most often draws conclusive links to 
Iran rather than Hezbollah, there is no question about Hezbollah’s participation in the 
skyjacking of TWA flight 847 from Rome to Beirut. The June 1985 hijacking saw 147 
passengers taken hostage by two Hezbollah operatives when the plane was diverted 
from its destination of Rome, Italy, to Beirut, Lebanon.126 The hostage situation was 
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intended to highlight the fate of 766 Lebanese prisoners held in Israel. The hijackers 
argued these prisoners were suffering in extremely difficult conditions and had no 
recourse to the protections of international law.127 The hijacking led to increased 
international attention to the regional conflict, but more importantly it exposed the deep 
tensions between Hezbollah and Amal. When Nabih Berri, then leader of Amal, 
attempted to mediate the crisis, Hezbollah heatedly objected that Berri had no authority 
to speak on their behalf or on behalf of the Shi’a in Lebanon.128  
The hijacking, and subsequent fiery public rejection of Nabih Berri as mediator, 
was a clear exposition of the animosity between Hezbollah and Amal.129 The hostage 
situation ended only after Israel quietly agreed to release their Lebanese prisoners from 
the Atlit prison and at the intervention of both Syria and Iranian Speaker Hashemi 
Rafsanjani pressured the perpetrators to bring the conflict to an end.130 The underlying 
discord between Hezbollah and Amal, however, increased continually until it finally 
exploded in 1988-89, with the two belligerent militias contending for the territory of 
Beirut and the South and the support of more than half the Shi’a population that 
resided there.131 The catalyst to the fighting was the kidnapping of U.S. marine Lt. 
Colonel William R. Higgins who was serving with the United Nations forces in the 
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south. The operation was carried out by the “Believers Resistance”, a group sympathetic 
to Hezbollah, and had serious implications for both Amal’s relationship with the United 
Nations forces in the country and with Hezbollah directly.132  
The Higgins kidnapping directly threatened Amal’s strategy of maintaining a 
cooperative working relationship with the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon) and they reacted by attempting to find Higgins and free him.133 The 
kidnappers were able to evade Amal operatives and would eventually murder Higgins, 
but not before the incident triggered serious violent engagements between the two 
groups. The violence intensified until the fall of 1988 when fighting erupted in the 
southern suburbs of Beirut and virtually Amal’s entire military foothold in the capital 
was destroyed.134 Hezbollah’s efforts to roll back Amal’s influence in the South were 
clear signs of their early commitment to become the indisputable representative of the 
Shi’a in Lebanon.135 By 1989, Hezbollah had succeeded in eroding Amal’s position in 
southern Lebanon and was poised to capitalize on the shifting regional political 
landscape that occurred when the civil war ended later that year.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
The influence of Lebanon’s sectarian political institutions on the agency of 
Lebanese individuals is one that necessitates that political expression be articulated 
through sectarian identities. This is a direct result of how the Ottoman Empire and 
French authorities attempted to create a system that would manage the cultural and 
ideological pluralities that existed in the region. The Lebanese political system prohibits 
strong cross-communal or national authority because it is based on a system of 
allocation rather than participation. Politics in Lebanon is assumed to be about struggle 
for communal shares of power, not in the equal participation in the administration and 
governance of the country. This type of system perpetuates the creation of privileged 
groups and social exclusion. Institutional expansion throughout the 1900s necessitated 
the development of political parties in Lebanon that could mobilize communal 
members, articulate communal interests, and provide individuals to take positions in 
the expanding state apparatus.136 This institutional change was coupled with political 
and economic changes in the region. The complex interplay of these mercurial forces 
shaped how different groups acquired authority and legitimacy during the time period. 
Naturally, this makes it the perfect environment for the creation of resistance 
organizations such as Hezbollah. As a strong representative of the Shi’a sect in Lebanon, 
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it functions as a quasi-mediator between the interests and demands of that sect and the 
Lebanese state. In this sense, Hezbollah is a political party grounded in the practices and 
political logics of all political parties in Lebanon, and the majority of political parties 
globally.  
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Chapter 4: Resistance Identity and Ideology 
In 1985, in the middle of the Lebanese civil war and after the occupation of 
Southern Lebanon by Israeli forces, Hezbollah announced their existence to the world 
and declared their ideology and goals through the Open Letter. Hezbollah’s ideology 
and core principles are rooted in their religious beliefs, and, as such, these have 
remained constant throughout their political and organizational development. At the 
same time, the organization has created a level of flexibility in their ideology that allows 
them to adapt their discourse to the changing security and political environment. 
Recognizing their ideological flexibility allows us to understand how Hezbollah 
responds to instrumental and organizational problems moving forward. From an 
instrumental standpoint, Hezbollah’s ideology will determine the importance of 
variables in their cost vs. benefit analysis. The influence of ideology on the 
organizational view determines the types of incentives that will be offered to the 
members of the organization and the direction the leadership must adopt. While the 
previous chapter focused on analyzing the conditions that allowed Hezbollah to emerge 
in Lebanon, this chapter turns its attention to how Hezbollah established their ideology 
and created their unique identity in the Lebanese community. 
A comprehensive look at Hezbollah’s ideology directly relates to my thesis 
question in several important ways. First and foremost, the role of ideology is important 
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insofar as it frames the group’s worldview and determines their core objectives while 
simultaneously establishing the framework for the group’s strategy to achieve these 
objectives. Furthermore, the group’s ideology determines the identification of the 
enemy and the acceptable methods the organization will use to attempt to defeat them. 
Last, Hezbollah’s ideology creates a unique resistance identity derived from a complex 
interplay of notions and interpretations derived from Shi’a law, Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
theory of the wilayat al-faqih (rule of the jurist), Shi’a history and religious and cultural 
beliefs that render resistance a religious obligation for all Muslims. Explaining 
Hezbollah’s ideology and definition of resistance is important to my thesis because it 
shows how the parameters of their belief system allows room for the organization to 
make the transition from violent to non-violent forms of political expression in the first 
place. This chapter will focus on establishing the basis for Hezbollah’s ideological 
thought, unpacking the core tenets of their belief system, and explaining the subsequent 
formation of the organization’s identity vis-à-vis their line of reasoning.  
4.1 The Islamic Resurgence and Iranian Revolution 
In the 1970s the Middle Eastern Muslim community faced a number of 
interrelated crises in succession. Secularism, government nepotism and corruption, 
economic mismanagement and inequalities, and the uneven manifestation of 
modernization all contributed to the turmoil in the region that saw multiple 
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governments face revolutionary resistance.137 Furthermore, the political and religious 
backlash towards various Middle Eastern government’s inability to eliminate Israel, 
considered an illegal occupier of holy Muslim lands by the majority of Arab peoples, 
and the increasing influence of western imperialist powers produced significant anxiety 
in the Muslim population in the region.138 The governments of Egypt, Syria, and Iran all 
found themselves attempting to suppress the factious demands of their citizens who 
desired an alternative method of governance, one that many believed could be derived 
from Islam.  
Historically, peoples are inclined to turn to religion during times of crisis.139 The 
appeal of Islamic governance was similar to that of Christianity in the New World. It 
offered solid community attachments, a network of existing religious and charitable 
institutions capable of meeting the spiritual and material needs of the population, and 
offered an existing moral ideology usable by individuals and communities to reinforce 
their identity. Religion, however, is open to interpretation and so the Islamic revival was 
pursued in various ways across the region based on the interpretations of religious 
leaders. For the purpose of this thesis it’s important to emphasize that the 
fundamentalist groups, who exhibited extreme reactions and urged radical Islamic 
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revolution, were in the minority. The general population was far more inclined to a 
moderate approach that involved using Islamic scripture to justify working within non-
Islamic governments to promote reform rather than undertaking jihad to overthrow 
them.140 That said the discourse was not whether an Islamic approach to government 
and community was necessary, rather only the approach on how it should be 
established. 
Regional clashes between fundamentalist and moderate interpretations were 
frequent during this period, notably in Egypt and Syria, with moderates coming out on 
top. The exception is Iran, who underwent a conflict of secularism similar to Syria’s, but 
in Iran it was the fundamentalists that triumphed and established an Islamic Republic 
in 1979. The close relationship the Shah maintained with the United States fueled 
resentment within the religious leaders in Iran, who viewed the country’s growing 
dependency on the United States, and the influence of America’s secular culture on 
Iranian society, with disdain.141 This coupled with the Shah’s efforts to modernize Iran 
in ways promoted by the US represented a serious threat to not only the Islamic 
institutions in the country, but also to the authority of the Shi’a clergy in Iran.142 
Naturally, this led to resistance by Shi’a clergy and specifically was the catalyst to 
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Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who played the leading role in mobilizing the eventual 
Islamic Revolution. 
Khomeini would fully consolidate his authority in Iran with help of the 
Revolutionary Guards, an officially recognized standing militia in Iran, and then take 
the necessary steps to establish an Islamic Republic where he became the all-wise 
Supreme Jurist.143 Henceforth, Iran has been governed in accordance with sharia 
(religious) law, as interpreted by the Supreme Jurist in consultation with his Islamic 
clergy, who are key members of Iran’s governing institutions. The successful revolution 
in Iran, and Khomeini’s consolidation of power, would serve as proof that the Islamic 
ideal could be realized for Hezbollah and various other Islamic resistance groups in the 
region. 
The lessons of the Islamic Revolution flowed throughout the region, especially in 
the Gulf States, West Bank, and Gaza, but it had its most profound impact on the young 
revolutionaries who formed Hezbollah, who identify with the Revolution’s ideology, 
and embrace the principle of government by the Supreme Jurist.144 The use of the 
Revolutionary Guard in Iran and concurrent belief that armed struggle is not only 
justified but a sacred imperative opened Hezbollah to practices that were traditionally 
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rejected by Shi’a leaders over the centuries in favour of passive forms of political 
expression.145 
Hezbollah’s version of fundamentalism embraces the core principles of Iran’s 
Islamic ideology; the importance of struggling against secularism, injustice, and the 
oppression of Muslims by foreign imperialists and their regional proxy, Israel. Their 
vision of creating an expansive Islamic community follows Ayatollah Khomeini’s goal 
of exporting the Islamic Revolution throughout the region. Hezbollah’s leaders connect 
Khomeini’s ideology to their own while using it as a way to legitimize their resistance 
to the Israeli occupation. 
4.2 The Open Letter (Oppressed vs Oppressor) 
The first declaration of principles and foundational document of Hezbollah was 
published on February 16, 1985, in the midst of both the Lebanese civil war and the 
Israeli intervention in the country. The document reflected a Manichaean view of the 
world divided between the forces of evil, the oppressors, and the forces of good, the 
Party of God.146 The Open Letter, released after Israel’s partial flight from Lebanon in 
1985, was the initial solidification of Hezbollah’s political vision.147 This publication had 
far reaching implications for Hezbollah, transforming them from a secret resistance 
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enterprise free from political and media interactions into a publicly recognized political 
party. By no means did this signal the end of Hezbollah’s military resistance in southern 
Lebanon. In fact, after the ideological declarations in the Open Letter were made public 
there was a marked increase in distinguished resistance operations.148 The TWA 
hijacking and Higgins kidnapping discussed in Chapter 3 are examples that can be 
definitively attributed to Hezbollah during this period. It is argued by U.S. intelligence 
agencies, however, that Hezbollah was directly responsible for some of the most 
destructive suicide bombings of the era before the attacks on the World Trade Center in 
September of 2011.149 These include several suicide bombings in 1983, one where a TNT 
laden truck was driven into the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut and killed 241 
Americans, and another on the same day where 58 French paratroopers were killed.150 
Last, the suicide bombing of the American embassy in Beirut has been widely argued to 
have been perpetrated by Hezbollah.151 These incidents were only a part of Hezbollah’s 
operations as the organization continued to conduct kidnappings and hijackings of 
foreigners within Lebanon. Still, the Open Letter was important to Hezbollah as it 
established several fundamental tenets that are central to their strategy today. These 
include the establishment of an Islamic state, resistance to the Zionists, pan-Islamism, 
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anti-imperialism, and the fulfillment of jihad.152 While these specific ideological 
declarations can help us understand Hezbollah’s style and trajectory of political 
expression from 1985 to the elections in 1992, first it is important to explore the focal 
method of reasoning that influences Hezbollah’s worldview and shapes their actions 
and organization structure: the relationship between the Oppressor and the Oppressed. 
Central to Hezbollah’s notion of political action is the division of the world, 
formulated by Ayatollah Khomeini, into mustakbirin (oppressors) and mustad’afin 
(oppressed).153 This conceptual dichotomy is so important to Hezbollah’s ideology that 
it is invoked in almost every official’s public address. Furthermore, both the Open 
Letter of 1985 and Hezbollah’s 1992 electoral programme are addressed to the 
oppressed, demonstrating that regardless of how the organization is pursuing their 
political ends that they have a clear understanding of who they assume their target 
constituency to be. More than just Shi’a Muslims in Lebanon, Hezbollah suggests that 
the oppressed are a global population of those suffering cultural, political, economic, 
and social degradation at the hands of the oppressors. 
Although Hezbollah seems to employ an exclusivist discourse in which it 
classifies people according to the Qu’ranic dichotomy of Hezbollah (The Party of God) 
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and Hizb al-Shaytan (The Party of the Devil), the group in fact uses the Islamic 
expression of oppressed and reproduces it as an all-inclusive concept in order to uphold 
political and social justice.154 In the Open Letter they write:  
“our friends carry ideas that do not conform to Islam… but this does not 
preclude cooperation with you in order to achieve these goals… especially since 
we feel that the motives which exhort you to struggle are Muslim motives in the 
first place, originating from confronting oppression and tyranny that have been 
practiced and imposed upon you…”155 
The definition of oppressed for Hezbollah is different from that of Khomeini in its focus 
on a Marxist style terminology that is then filtered through an Islamic interpretation of 
economic, political, and social justice. The end result can be described as a kind of 
Islamic socialism, one that focuses on the well-being of all oppressed people. 
Hezbollah clearly articulates in the Open Letter and their other political 
declarations that they seek to represent and ally themselves with oppressed people 
throughout the entire world, irrespective of their color, race, or religion.156 The party 
interprets and applies the contemporary concept of mustad’afin by stressing that it is a 
Qu’ranic concept based in the advent of the Islamic Revolution.157 They argue their 
usage of the concept is in conformity with the party’s identity as an Islamic jihadi 
movement struggling to address and redress the injustices suffered by the oppressed. 
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This, according to Hezbollah, is different than the political usage found in 
contemporary socialist or Marxist theories that refer to the proletariat.158 Hezbollah 
emphasizes that mustad’afin applies to the wronged, unjustly treated, tyrannized, and 
impoverished who do not own their daily bread, and who are oppressed in their 
freedom, dignity, and endeavours without any consideration whether they are 
Christians, Muslims, or otherwise.159 Therefore, Hezbollah’s political ideology stresses 
the universality of the Qu’ranic concept, instead of the specificity of its Marxist 
counterpoint, one that cuts across class, cultural, and religious cleavages. 
Hezbollah specifically mentions the homeless in Lebanon and refers to Shi’a 
southerners when describing the oppressed. This would seem to contradict the 
distinction between Qu’ranic and Marxist definitions.160 The important distinction, 
however, is that the classification of Shi’a in Lebanon as oppressed does not stem from 
the Qu’ran but from the Israeli occupation and the socio-economic inequalities typifying 
Lebanese society described in the previous chapter. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the Shi’a in Lebanon developed a community as a result of the formation of 
sectarian institutions, consistent government under representation, and socio-economic 
inequalities in the country. Therefore, Hezbollah’s designation of the Shi’a in Lebanon 
as oppressed emanates from a class analysis perspective as opposed to an Islamic one. 
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Accordingly, economic status alone is insufficient criterion for Hezbollah’s 
definition of the oppressed. Poverty, while a common characteristic, is less determinate 
than deprivation and exploitation.161 Only when poverty is the result of state 
discrimination, negligence, and abuse is it synonymous with Hezbollah’s definition of 
oppression. Furthermore, deprivation and exploitation extend beyond mere economic 
definitions. The incorporation of all social classes into the definition is based on the 
Qu’ranic portrayal of the oppressed as those who are economically, but also, politically, 
or culturally weak vis-à-vis the oppressors.162 This serves to reinforce the universality of 
the definition, encompassing all social classes and religious denominations. 
Unlike many Islamic fundamentalist groups who deem those Muslims who do 
not subscribe to their Islamic vision as infidels, and who view secularist Muslims as 
apostates who ought to be punished by death, Hezbollah has no such discourse that 
declares the infidelity of adversaries.163 Hezbollah articulates very clearly that only the 
oppressors are denounced, regardless of religious identities and political leanings. Also, 
secularism is not denounced by the party by default. Only those who “do not uphold 
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your covenants with the Muslims and engage in aggression against them”164 or enforce 
secularism as a state religion are considered oppressors.  
The history of Lebanon’s sectarian system was discussed at length in the 
previous chapter, but here its relationship to Hezbollah can be better investigated. 
Initially, Hezbollah firmly rejected any notions of participation in Lebanese political 
institutions. This does not suggest, however, that Hezbollah is necessarily either an 
expression of this secular political history or a rejection of it. Rather, Lebanon’s political 
history was a catalyst to creating the necessary social support that encouraged 
Hezbollah’s creation. Hezbollah’s rejection of the Lebanese political system is also 
seemingly derived more so from their definitions of oppressor and oppressed than it is 
a rejection of secular forms of government. They instead rejected the Lebanese system 
because it was forced onto the oppressed in Lebanon by colonial rulers and 
marginalized their rights as Shi’a Muslims. Ultimately, this suggests that even early on 
the organization considered participation in the Lebanese political system a potentially 
sufficient mechanism for Hezbollah’s political expression if its oppressive nature can be 
addressed. 
The distinction between Islamic, Marxist, and Hezbollah’s definition of 
oppression is important because it demonstrates an early indication of possible 
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reconciliation between the organization and the political system in Lebanon. That said 
the possibility for political reconciliation does not extend to those Hezbollah defines as 
the oppressors. Ultimately, the West and those who identify with the West are deemed 
oppressors. The fact that they generally belong to the upper classes of society is 
coincidental, as is their religious identity. Specifically, it is the attitude of Zionism and 
the West, in particular that of the United States, that differentiates the oppressors from 
the politically and culturally oppressed. The occupation of southern Lebanon by Israel 
renders the Israeli government the ultimate oppressor outside of the United States.165 
The definition also extends to the “various occupiers of the lands of the oppressed” and 
to the “tyrannical regimes governing the oppressed whose subservience to the West, in 
addition to their inherent injustice as dictatorships, translates into oppression”.166 This 
was explicitly stated through the denouncement and condemnation of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, historic colonial interventions, and crimes perpetrated by 
America in Vietnam, Iran, Nicaragua, Granada, Palestine, and Lebanon.167 Specifically 
Hezbollah names their major foes as “Israel, America, France, and the Phalangists”.168 It 
is against these enemies that Hezbollah urges their “oppressed friends” to form a 
common identity of resistance to oppression and to strive for the unity of humanity. 
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4.3 Hezbollah’s Resistance Identity 
The global relationship between the oppressors and oppressed in Hezbollah’s 
ideology is the most influential factor shaping the organization’s goals, structure, and 
world view. The dichotomy between oppressor and oppressed relates directly to what 
Manuel Castells theorizes as a “resistance identity”.169 According to Castells, resistance 
identity is “generated by those actors that are in positions/conditions devaluated and/or 
stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and 
survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the 
institutions of society”.170 Though this seems to explain Hezbollah’s identity and 
ideological perspective, the second part of resistance identity theory pertains directly to 
the overall goal of this thesis. Castells’ suggests these identities resist and hardly ever 
communicate with the state, except to struggle, negotiate, and bargain on behalf of their 
specific interests and values, so as to acquire vital services and resources for their 
constituencies.171 While this is true of Hezbollah in its early formative stages, we know 
that the organization made a marked transition from focusing on violent political 
expression and resistance to an inclusionary method that involved acting within 
Lebanese institutions in order to address their political and resistance concerns. Though 
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the resistance identity directly relates to the question of oppression and resistance that 
is central to Hezbollah’s world view, which in turn influences both the organization’s 
goals and structure, its insufficient on its own to describe how groups might transition 
away from exclusionary and confrontational ideological criteria.   
Castells’ explanation of the development of a resistance identity for 
organizations applies to Hezbollah’s formation but not to how they transitioned non-
violent forms of political expression. Castells argues that those groups who are capable 
of “building a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by so doing, seek 
the transformation of overall social structure” have developed a project identity.172 
There is nothing to suggest that identities that begin as resistance cannot mature into 
projects. Similarly, neither identity has progressive or regressive value outside its 
historical context.173 Most importantly, however, is that how, and by whom, different 
types of identities are constructed, and with what outcomes, is a matter of social 
context.174 This reinforces the need for combining both the instrumental and 
organizational approaches explained in chapter two when analyzing not only how 
Hezbollah originally formed, but societal and group factors at play during the course of 
the organization’s transformation. The rest of this chapter is devoted to exploring the 
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basis for Hezbollah’s ideological beliefs in their formative years and the influence of 
these beliefs on the organization’s ability to transform themselves politically. 
The resistance agenda is at the core of Hezbollah’s raison d’être with respect to 
Israel, the United States, and its allies. In this sense, the group thrives on conflict, and 
they need an ongoing confrontation with these clearly defined enemies to maintain both 
external legitimacy and a wide supportive base both in Lebanon and abroad. However, 
there is nothing that suggests that their resistance identity necessitates that the 
organization uses violence to address these conflicts. As discussed later in the chapter, 
Hezbollah employs a narrative that focuses on fundamental principles of Islamic beliefs 
that can be pursued by individuals in both violent and non-violent capacities.  
While the Qu’ranic influence on Hezbollah is intricately woven into their 
political ideology, the organization simplifies their ideological narrative by framing it in 
the context of good against evil. They accomplish this by employing a distinct division 
of the world into mutually exclusive groups, the oppressors and the oppressed. The 
unequal power dynamic that exists between these two groups places Hezbollah in a 
constant struggle. While this creates a distinct resistance identity the group uses to 
influence their choice of goals and the organization’s structure, it does not necessarily 
mean that the goals of the group, or the means they use to pursue these goals, will be 
static or violent. In fact, by creating a definition of the oppressed that encompasses the 
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majority of people worldwide, Hezbollah creates a certain ideological flexibility that can 
be applied to how they choose their goals and in the methods they employ to pursue 
them.  
4.4 Hezbollah’s stated goals moving forward  
The clearest indication of the organization’s prioritisation of their resistance 
ideology lies in its goals explicitly stated in the Open Letter. Throughout its history 
Hezbollah has continuously striven to show that the attainment of political power is 
secondary to its goal of liberating the occupied zone. The organization’s goals fall under 
three main categories. The organization’s primary goal is resistance to the Israeli 
occupation in Lebanon. This includes a broad anti-imperialist agenda aimed at those 
that support the Israeli occupation and help make it possible. Their second goal is the 
creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon. Drawing on the Iranian Revolution as 
inspiration Hezbollah looks to reshape political institutions in Lebanon with an Islamic 
influence. Last is the organization’s pursuit of jihad. Hezbollah emphasizes their specific 
goals with an inclusionary vision of jihad that the organization applies to all Muslims 
globally. In structuring their ideology and specific goals in this way, Hezbollah 
prioritized a resistance agenda over secondary goals that pertained to influencing state 
political institutions in Lebanon while simultaneously allowing interested individuals 
to be included in the organization’s ambitions by non-violent means. 
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The Israeli occupation of South Lebanon discussed in the previous chapter was 
the catalyst to the creation of Hezbollah. It is no surprise then that Hezbollah has 
consistently upheld the conviction that Israel represents the ultimate oppressor and 
therefore perceives its resistance to the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory its most 
important goal.175 A sustained military campaign against a regional superpower like 
Israel, however, requires considerable planning, funding, and logistics. This, combined 
with Hezbollah’s irreconcilable stance towards Israel, creates an environment of 
continuous conflict that reinforces the organization’s resistance ideology and raison 
d’être.  
Central to Hezbollah’s political ideology is their anti-Zionist rhetoric that often 
conflates Jewish identity with Zionist ideology, thus equating Jews with Zionists.176 In 
the Open Letter and their political declarations since 1985, Hezbollah clearly states that 
they equate all Israelis occupying Palestinian and Lebanese territory with Zionists.177 
Their advocacy for the destruction of Israel is based on Hezbollah’s ideological 
understanding that current Israeli territory is an illegal occupation by Zionists. Joseph 
Alagha writes that “Hezbollah characterizes Israel as an aggressive, racist, expansionist, 
anti-humanist, cancerous gland instated by Western colonial powers in the Muslim 
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Heartland”.178 However, Hezbollah clarifies that they do not discriminate against the 
Jews as a race or religion and that they would accord them their human and civil rights 
regardless of their constant conflict. This distinction between Jews living in Muslim 
countries and Muslim rule and the “Zionists” in Israel closely resembles the stance of 
Khomeini’s.179 Simply stated then, in the eyes of the organization there are no Jews 
living in Israel, only Zionists. Furthermore, Hezbollah views the occupation of Palestine 
by Israel in the same way it views its occupation of Lebanese territory, coupling their 
domestic resistance to a continual regional commitment to the liberation of Palestine. 
This rhetoric has forced Hezbollah into a prolonged conflict with the significantly 
stronger Israeli government to the south, further reinforcing their resistance agenda. 
The common ground individuals can find with one another in Hezbollah’s 
resistance to Israel exists in the extension of their ideology to those oppressed globally 
by imperialist entities. Due to the deep religious underpinnings of the group, Hezbollah 
emphasizes that they are exercising their legitimate license to defend the rights and 
dignity of the umma (global Muslim community) by confronting their basic enemies; the 
US, France, and Israel.180 It is important to note that according to Hezbollah the basis for 
this conflict is derived from what Jalal Al-e-Ahmad classified as “Westoxification” and 
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not xenophobia.181 Rather than antipathy to the West and East, “Westoxification” is 
defined by an overbearing cultural “disease spreading in an environment rendered 
susceptible to it” by materialist powers.182 These materialist powers affect all people 
globally, regardless of their ideological and religious underpinnings. Thus, the anti-
imperialist sentiment of Hezbollah is deeply rooted in their hatred for those they 
consider to be the perpetuators of the “Westoxification”, the corporate and government 
administrations, and not the individual citizens of western nations themselves whom 
they see as oppressed. Hezbollah uses this to claim an ideological superiority over the 
West and to justify their Islamic response to the materialism and rationalism found in 
Western culture: jihad. By building holistic-coalescent individuals, Hezbollah purports 
that the project of the Islamic Revolution does not aim at “modernizing Islam”, but 
instead seeks to “Islamize modernity”.183 The organization firmly believes this Islamic 
response poses a threat to Western rationalism and materialism and is irreconcilable.  
As its primary focus, resisting Israeli and imperialist powers also became the 
essential area in which Hezbollah would invest its resources and significantly influence 
how the group would structure itself.  From a principal and doctrinal perspective, 
Hezbollah’s political ideology aims to establish Muslim rights in Lebanon free from 
Israeli and Western influences. Furthermore, they aim to restore Muslim historical 
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rights in Palestine and therefore are completely against any ceasefire, truce, land for 
peace, peace negotiations, or normalization of relations with Israel and Israeli 
supporters in the region.184 
One of the pillars of Hezbollah’s early intellectual structure is the Islamic state 
ideal. In contrast to their foreign policy, which has been extremely consistent 
throughout the organization’s history, Hezbollah’s view of its role in Lebanon has 
shifted dramatically since their original conception. In the 1985 Open Letter, Hezbollah 
called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon and rejected the possibility of 
participating in what it saw as the inherently corrupt existing political system in the 
country.185 Hezbollah stresses in their political ideology that while they reject the 
sectarian-confessional political system in Lebanon, they would not attempt to impose an 
Islamic state by force, rather they would only construct it if the majority of the Lebanese 
population demanded and consented to it, including the Christian population. Heavily 
influenced by Khomeini’s teachings and the Iranian Revolution, the organization 
believed the Lebanese Islamic state would be modeled after Iran and be the first step 
toward establishing a larger, pan-Islamic state that would unite all Muslims in the 
region.186 
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The Open Letter classifies Hezbollah as a social movement that calls for the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon modeled on Iran’s Islamic Republic.187 The 
declaration does not plainly specify the political-ideological content of the Islamic 
order; it only refers to the Islamic state as an ideological doctrine, political order, and 
mode of governance.188 It does, however, suggest that the foundation for the Islamic 
order is derived from the practical application of the shari’a and divine injunctions.189 
They stress that the common ground between ahl al-dhimma, or non-Muslim citizens of 
an Islamic state, and Muslims is respecting social values of mutual tolerance, respect, 
brotherhood, and solidarity. On this basis, Hezbollah accords the Christians in Lebanon 
their social and religious freedoms, but not political freedom. This is significant because 
it defines who Hezbollah is willing to participate with, and in what political capacity, in 
both domestic and international realms of governance.  
Hezbollah’s early desire to create an Islamic state was not confined to regional 
issues. A core tenet to their belief system is heeding the call of Khomeini’s call for pan-
Islamism to avoid the “dangers of discord”.190 This directive has become especially 
important in the wake of what Khomeini termed the “worldwide conspiracy against the 
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unity of Muslims”.191 Used in conjunction with Hezbollah’s ideology of oppressor 
against oppressed, section 22 of the Open Letter advocates pan-Islamism and warns 
against following Muslim religious scholars who apply the “imperialist colonizers 
precept of divide and conquer”.192 Thus, any political or military dispute between Sunni 
and Shi’a groups is considered by Hezbollah to be an oppressor-colonizer’s conspiracy 
aimed at spreading discord and dissension among the Muslim population. By adopting 
this ideological stance, Hezbollah not only aims at discrediting Muslim scholars who 
would oppose their ideological views, but is also attempting to appeal to the substantial 
Sunni and Shi’a populations in Lebanon and to Muslims on a global scale.  
The vision of an Islamic state in Lebanon, and a pan-Islamic state in the region, 
governs a substantial amount of Hezbollah’s rhetoric and, in their view, applies to all 
Muslims worldwide. Hezbollah is careful not to use specific examples of Sunni-Shi’a 
disagreements because this would inevitably lead to discord and be counterproductive 
to the organization’s goal of uniting all Muslims under their ideology. Also, it is 
important to remember that Hezbollah espoused these ideological beliefs at the height 
of the civil war in Lebanon. The Muslim population in Lebanon is a significant majority 
compared to other groups and if unified could have substantial influence on how the 
country’s institutions would be shaped following the civil war. Similar to their 
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discourse of oppressor and oppressed, Hezbollah promotes an inclusionary vision of 
the Islamic state, both in Lebanon and abroad, that emphasizes common ideological-
political dimensions that apply to all Muslims.  
Derived from the Arabic verb jahada (which means to endeavour, strive, or 
struggle), the Qu’ranic concept of jihad is used to describe any activity that strives in the 
cause of God and Islam through either individual or communal basis.193 Hezbollah 
employs a specific definition whereby “any act which exerts effort in God’s cause is 
jihad”. In this respect, however, they do not mean God’s personal cause, but rather the 
cause of mankind.194 The cause of mankind is “the cause of the people, the cause of the 
oppressed, the cause of pride, honour, and glory… the cause of defense of the land, the 
cause of the defense of religion and of values of humanity”.195 This definition of jihad 
works in conjunction with Hezbollah’s resistance identity and is considered a defensive 
activity, as opposed to an offensive one. In the same vein as Hezbollah’s political 
ideology concerning the oppressed, the organization’s view of jihad is one that is 
inclusionary beyond simply violent means of action. This is demonstrated by their 
distinction between lesser and greater jihad and how they apply this definition of 
martyrdom.  
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There are two distinct forms of jihad that are promoted by Hezbollah. The first is 
lesser jihad, or the defensive military action in the battlefield against the enemies of 
Islam.196 The second is greater jihad, or the internal struggle individuals face within 
themselves.197 Combined, these two definitions encompass almost any effort that is 
exerted in defense of Hezbollah’s resistance goals as a form of jihad. Similarly, any death 
that results from an individual’s conviction to these efforts can be depicted as an 
instance of martyrdom. Hezbollah appeals to individuals by showing their struggle to 
be closely related to important Islamic concepts that influence communal identities in 
Lebanon. The subtext is that Muslims may pursue martyrdom without engaging in a 
military jihad, and that jihad itself is not confined to military activity. The composition of 
Hezbollah’s definitions and concepts are designed to be used in a manner that applies 
to every Muslim. 
The ideological-political dimension of greater jihad is emphasized through any 
level of engagement with Hezbollah’s activities.198 Thus, Hezbollah appeals to an 
individual’s concept of identity by suggesting mere membership and participation in 
any capacity will fulfill their political responsibility. Of the two, greater jihad is 
considered by Hezbollah to be more important because success in lesser jihad is 
contingent on success in the greater. Only after an individual is successful in the 
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struggle with their desires will they be capable of confronting the enemy.199 This works 
to reinforce the concept of struggle in Hezbollah’s resistance identity, both with oneself 
and with the enemy, and serves as a method of reinforcing a distinct Islamic identity 
within the group and its membership. 
Though lesser jihad is relegated to a secondary role in Hezbollah’s political 
rhetoric, it is the focal point of many of its operations and how the organization is 
structured. The party construes oppression in a way that equates non-resistance 
through jihad to death.200 Muslims that refuse to embark on a jihad are not only 
considered to be dead in this life, but are marred by “disgrace, shame, and degradation” 
in the afterlife as well.201 According to this logic, “an honourable death” is decidedly 
“preferable to a humiliating life”, and therefore that the true meaning of life lies in 
resistance and martyrdom.202 
Through this understanding of resistance, rejection of humiliation, and jihad, 
Hezbollah insists that its resistance to Israel’s occupation of South Lebanon is not only a 
“sacred right” that may be relinquished, but also a “religious legal obligation” that 
cannot. This obligation is binding for all believers, even if Israel does not fire a single 
bullet, because their very occupation is an act of aggression and a form of subjugation – 
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both of which necessitate Muslims to respond via defensive jihad.203 By combining 
greater and lesser jihad with their resistance identity it appeals directly to individuals in 
the Muslim community. Hezbollah insists all Muslims are called to jihad, regardless of 
whether they partake through violent resistance activity or not. The organization 
attempts to implicate the entire population in their obligatory notion of resistance, one 
they perceive to be grounded in an individual’s “humanitarian” and “moral” duty. 
Nonetheless, the group states that “our religious ideology is the first of [our] 
conditions”, affirming their religious underpinnings and the Islamic character of 
Hezbollah’s resistance.  
4.5 Conclusion 
The resistance identity is so integral to Hezbollah’s political ideology that both 
the military and political wings of the organization are identified in synch with each 
other. Husayn Al-Musawi, a founding member of Amal and Hezbollah, would go as far 
as to state that “The Resistance is Hezbollah and Hezbollah is the Resistance”.204 All 
members of Hezbollah’s political and social institutions are considered a part of the 
Resistance, all Resistance fighters are considered part of Hezbollah. Everything about 
the group is filtered through its ideological understanding of jihad and the resistance 
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relationship between the oppressors and the oppressed of the world.205 Accordingly, 
much of Hezbollah’s political thought focuses on the religious and moral bases for 
political accommodation and political violence in non-Islamic states. 
The relationship between Hezbollah’s ideology and the organization’s goals, 
however, has shown a certain degree of flexibility. They have structured their 
worldview in such a way that while Israel still occupies parts of Southern Lebanon they 
are affiliated with liberating the occupied zone. However, if Israel were to withdraw 
from the occupied zone, Hezbollah has maintained the ability to become compatible 
with other political goals and priorities – in particular through their relationship to the 
global oppressed. The organization’s inclusionary approach to resistance aims to 
reinforce their ideology through individual and communal moral commitments and 
responsibilities. This creates a new understanding of resistance for Hezbollah and their 
supporters, one that is understood beyond the narrow confines of illegitimate violent 
expression outside the apparatus of the state. Instead, resistance is a process carried out 
by individuals and communities relating to all facets of existence. In this way Hezbollah 
seems to almost uniquely combine Castell’s resistance and project identities by applying 
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their concept of resistance to every facet of an individual’s political and communal 
action – redefining resistance as the norm in their communal structures. 
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Chapter 5: Environmental and Organizational Factors 
Fundamentalist and radical organizations cannot continue to operate in a totally 
hostile political environment. They need to secure bases of operations, freedom of 
movement, safe havens, financing, and an available pool from which to recruit new 
members. In most cases, those needs are met with the help of a segment of the general 
population, both at home and abroad, that either sympathizes with the organization’s 
leadership or its political aims, identifies with its stated grievances, or is opposed to the 
governing authority against which the organization’s efforts are aimed.206 In the case of 
Hezbollah, the Lebanese civil war and Israeli occupation had created an insecure 
environment with regional actors whose influence and priorities were constantly in 
flux. The Syrian influence on the end of the civil war, Iran’s financial support for 
Hezbollah during the period, and the priorities of the Lebanese community all had a 
significant impact on how Hezbollah transformed itself from radical fundamentalist 
organization to mainstream political party during this period. This chapter aims to 
identify and examine the key environmental and organizational factors that influenced 
this transformation and answer the main questions set out in the first chapter of this 
thesis. Three main sections will be used to address the goal of the chapter. First, the 
instrumental approach to studying terrorism will be revisited with emphasis on the cost 
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vs. benefit analysis of the environmental factors affecting Hezbollah during the period. 
This includes their role in the Lebanese civil war, the regional influences on the war’s 
outcome, and the effect the changing geopolitical environment had on the organization 
moving forward. Second, the organizational factors that played a role in consolidating 
the direction of the leadership and support of the membership in the face of the 
changing political landscape in Lebanon. Creating and reinforcing a consistent message 
that the majority of Lebanese citizens could identify with was central to their 
organizational transition. The final section will focus on what the combination of these 
two analytical approaches tells us about Hezbollah’s political transition before the 1992 
election and acknowledge the limitation of treating terrorism as an identity rather than 
a tactic.  
5.1 External/Environment Factors 
As explained in the second chapter, this thesis aims to analyze Hezbollah’s 
political transition in Lebanon by utilizing a theoretical approach that combines the 
instrumental and organizational explanations as to why terrorist organizations act in 
the ways they do. The first of these two approaches, the instrumental approach, focuses 
on explaining terrorist behavior through an intentional cost versus benefit analysis 
conducted by the organization. The key elements to this equation are the benefits 
gained by the action, the costs of the attempt and of its failure, the consequences of 
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inaction, or the probability of success.207 By examining the changing conditions of 
Hezbollah’s environment outlined below, this thesis will show that by applying a cost 
versus benefit analysis it can be easily understood why the organization would make 
the transition to non-violent political expression by participating in Lebanese 
parliament. 
Upon its formation, Hezbollah lacked the kind of institutional depth and 
strength that helped them secure parliamentary seats in Lebanese elections from 1992 
until the present day. As previously outlined, Hezbollah had looked towards 
revolutionary Iran for both material and ideological support in their early years. The 
end of the civil war in 1989, however, marked a clear tempering of the organization’s 
original revolutionary zeal.208 Syrian influence on post-war Lebanon created a set of 
limitations and demands within the Lebanese political system explored below that 
Hezbollah was unable to ignore and would influence their transformation moving 
forward. 
During the Lebanese civil war, multiple sectarian and political groups exercised 
violence against one another and against the Israeli occupation. These groups included, 
but were not limited to, the Phalange Party and its mainly Christian allies in the 
Lebanese Front (LF), the Palestinian and mainly Muslim groups allied under the 
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umbrella of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), the South Lebanese Army (SLA), 
and other Lebanese, Israeli, and Syrian militias.209 Important to our discussion is the 
relationship between the civil war and the domestic security environment where 
Hezbollah functioned and how the events that led to the cessation of the former heavily 
influenced the latter. The political reality Hezbollah faced at the conclusion of the civil 
war necessitated that the organization adapt to their new political environment.  
Although the 1982 invasion was the catalyst to founding Hezbollah, they did not 
exist as a coherent organization until several years later. The Lebanese who comprised 
the first cadre were young, committed revolutionaries in their twenties and thirties.210 
Iran and Syria both played a large part in sponsoring, politically and monetarily, the 
group’s early conception. The creation of Hezbollah was a realization of Iran’s 
campaign to spread the message of their self-styled Islamic revolution.211 From Syria’s 
standpoint, Hezbollah was an instrument to promote their regional goals: maintaining 
their alliance with Iran, gaining the means to strike indirectly at both Israel and the 
United States, and have some level of influence in Lebanese politics.212 Lebanese 
resistance continued during this period, in large part thanks to Syrian and Iranian 
resources.  
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The dynamics of Lebanon’s civil war were important factors in Hezbollah’s rise 
and its course of development. Equally important, however, was Syria’s gradual 
political ascendency in Lebanon and the post-war role it assumed in that country that 
enabled Hezbollah to create an identity as a legitimate political actor and to continue 
their jihad activities against Israel under the auspices of the post-war Lebanese 
regime.213 This development legitimated the Party of God as an authentic Lebanese 
party and recast their struggle against the Israeli military and SLA from terrorist 
activity to national resistance.  
Lebanon had been designated by the Syrian Assad government as an important 
piece of their foreign policy strategy in the early 1980s.214 As the civil war unfolded in 
Lebanon, it was therefore essential that Hezbollah, who was supportive of the Iranian 
and Syrian positions, continued their resistance activities in the area. The desired goal 
was for Syrian allies to come out on top in the struggle against the Christian militias, or 
at least produce a military standstill, so that Damascus could translate its influence on 
the ground in Lebanon into an internationally accepted role to resolve the conflict. This 
would secure Syria’s influence in the political order that emerged after the end of 
hostilities.215 Syria’s primary challenge with respect to promoting Hezbollah in Lebanon 
was in brokering a deal between Hezbollah and the government. Most importantly it 
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required that the shift in Hezbollah’s political positions would receive official 
endorsement and further defend against regional accusations faced by the group of 
terrorism.216 It was with these provisions in mind that Syria directed its efforts towards 
brokering an agreement that would stabilize the Lebanese political situation.  
Lebanon’s civil war finally came to an end after the negotiation of the Wathiqat al-
tafahum al-watani (the Document of National understanding), more commonly referred 
to as the Ta’if Agreement.217 Hoping third-party mediation might work, an Arab 
initiative led by Syria and supported by the international community was launched in 
1989 to try and bring an end to the Lebanese civil war that had mostly reached a 
stalemate between the competing factions.  Representatives of King Fahd of Saudi 
Arabia, King Hassan of Morocco, and Algeria’s president, Chadli Ben Jadid, mediated 
the negotiations that were chaired by Lakhdar Ibrahmi, the Assistant Secretary General 
of the Arab League.218 Those Lebanese MP’s who had been elected before the start of the 
civil war began, nearly 15 years earlier, assembled in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia in 1989 and 
formally accepted the arrangement designed to end the hostilities between the factions. 
This Agreement outlined the reformulation of sectarian representation and several key 
aspects of political reform that related to Lebanon’s sovereignty and the legitimation of 
violence in the country.  
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Having ended the Lebanese civil war, the Ta’if Agreement forged a restructuring 
of Lebanese politics under Syrian hegemony. Though negotiations partially involved 
the Lebanese elites, many of its substantive elements, specifically those regarding 
Lebanon’s foreign policy, were essentially designed and agreed upon without Lebanese 
consent.219 Formal and informal negotiations were carried out amongst the major 
stakeholders, such as Saudi Arabia mentioned above but also with global players such 
as the United States, with clear indications that interpretation of the Agreement would 
be left to the Syrians, who had de facto control of the political system and domestic 
elite.220 The fact that the Agreement’s interpretation and implementation was under 
Syria’s discretion allowed them to manipulate the provisions to serve their political 
ends. The result involved addressing three significant problems in Lebanon related to 
our discussion: the need for internal institutional and administrative reform, the 
presence and armed capacity of the militias that had committed violence during the 
civil war, and the question of national identity.221 The first problem was addressed by 
allocating an equal number of parliamentary seats and posts among Muslims and 
Christians in an effort to create a more balanced distribution of state power. The second, 
and most pertinent to our discussion, was addressed by forcing all militias, except 
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Hezbollah, to disarm following the adoption of the Agreement. Lastly, the third was 
addressed by reaffirming the old National Pact agreement, which acknowledged the 
Arab identity of Lebanon and encouraged resistance to foreign interference.  
During the negotiation of the Agreement, Lebanon was under direct military 
occupation by Israel in the predominantly Shi’a populated areas of the south. The 
official position outlined in the Agreement toward Israeli occupation was articulated in 
the general provisions designating Lebanese sovereignty, including references to the 
role of the army, the disarmament of militias, and the role of Syria.222 Specifically, it 
advances that the state must take “all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese 
territories and to deploy the Lebanese army in the border area adjacent to Israel…” 
legitimizing political actors to continue violent resistance against Israeli forces 
occupying Lebanon.223 This provision provided the basis for Hezbollah to be exempted 
from the disarmament process in the Agreement, because they represented the only 
organized armed force within Lebanon that exercised violence almost exclusively 
against the Israeli occupation.224 This exemption was made possible because of the 
Syrian influence on interpreting the Ta’if Agreement and their desire to maintain 
support for armed struggled against Israel in Lebanese territories, creating a buffer 
between Syrian and Israeli conflict. This was a significant detail for Hezbollah because 
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their resistance identity is central to their ideology and group focus. Moving forward, 
any scenario that forced Hezbollah to abandon their focus on Israeli resistance would 
have compelled the group away from accepting the Ta’if Agreement and, ultimately, 
away from transitioning into members of Lebanese parliament. In any cost versus 
benefit analysis done by the organization, a scenario where the organization had to 
forfeit their raison d’être would have been deemed unacceptable. This provision, 
therefore, was how the Syrians were able to engineer Hezbollah’s acceptance of the Ta’if 
Agreement, which their leadership had initially rejected on various grounds. 
Without the exemption from disarmament Hezbollah would never have 
accepted the provisions outlined in the Ta’if Agreement, regardless of how detrimental 
that decision may have been. Originally, Hezbollah rejected what they saw as a 
repetition of the 1943 National Pact, in so far as the Agreement did not abolish political 
sectarianism, or alter the structural conditions of sectarian privilege.225 The organization, 
however, accepted the security aspects of the Agreement because it allowed Hezbollah 
to remain armed while all other Lebanese militias were forced to disarm. Therefore, the 
Agreement served as an implicit recognition of Hezbollah’s right of resistance and its 
monopoly on non-state violence within Lebanon. Furthermore, it meant that the 
Lebanese state and its various sectarian groups were effectively sanctioning Hezbollah’s 
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resistance against Israeli occupation as representative of the demands of the Lebanese 
people.226 The Ta’if Agreement would serve as a blueprint for a post-war Lebanese 
political order, one that guaranteed Hezbollah a monopoly on non-state violence and 
explicitly reinforced the group’s resistance society ideology.  
The Syrian implementation of the provisions of the Ta’if Agreement would have 
a significant impact on the meaning and politics of violence in Lebanon moving 
forward. First, civil violence was no longer an acceptable mechanism for the resolution 
of intercommunal tensions. Those few groups that did resist the Syrians in opposition to 
Ta’if were violently suppressed by the Syrian military. The message was clear - the 
Syrian military infrastructure would suppress anyone opposing the pax-Syriana in 
Lebanon or who sought to exercise violence as a means of dialogue and political 
expression.227 Most importantly for Hezbollah, the implementation of Ta’if stabilized the 
country by effectively eliminating the routineness of civil violence in the preceding 
decade of civil war. The Ta’if agreement also provided the political mechanisms for 
intercommunal negotiation and promoted a secure environment through the Syrian 
military presence in the country that ensured civil violence would not perpetuate.228 
Second, by sanctioning civil violence and disarming all militias but Hezbollah, the 
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Syrians interpreted Ta’if as sanctioning forms of violent resistance exclusively against 
Israel. This meant implicitly supporting Hezbollah’s right to armament and resistance 
of Israeli occupation, as they had consistently been the main actor involved in resistance 
activity. Thus, of the two kinds of violence experienced in Lebanon during the civil war, 
civil and resistance violence, the latter was sanctioned to continue after the war’s end 
and implicitly only by Hezbollah.  
By applying the instrumental approach to analyzing the events leading up to, 
and following, the Ta’if Agreement, a strong argument can be made that the interplay of 
influences surrounding its creation and implementation was the most significant 
environmental variable affecting Hezbollah’s transformation. The costs of opposition 
were significant and clear. If Hezbollah stood in opposition to the Agreement, not only 
would they lose the benefit of Syrian support and protection, in all likelihood they 
would have turned the Syrian security apparatus against them in Lebanon. 
Furthermore, by adopting the Agreement they not only assured continued Syrian 
support domestically, but more importantly accepting the provisions of the Agreement 
provided a level of legitimacy to the organization’s resistance against Israel that other 
regional groups did not have. This created an opportunity for Hezbollah to present 
itself in Lebanon as a legitimate political actor while simultaneously justifying the 
struggle of their resistance priority.  
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The final significant change resulting from the implementation of the Ta’if 
Agreement was that it placed the Lebanese Army and security services at the command 
of the Syrian security apparatus. This meant that the Army, and by extension the 
Lebanese state, did not have the means to exercise effective control over defense and 
security issues.229 The major positions in the Army and Lebanese security services were 
mostly purged and replaced with pro-Syrian officials, individuals the Syrian 
government were confident would follow their security orders, orders that specifically 
included co-existing with Hezbollah and its resistance activities. For Hezbollah, the 
right of violence was protected by the Syrian presence in Lebanon and their 
interpretation of the security provisions of the Agreement. This all but necessitated that 
Hezbollah further engage in the Lebanese domestic political system to safeguard the 
security interpretations of the Ta’if. 
The preceding chapters focused on the conditions that allowed Hezbollah to 
emerge in Lebanon. Up until this point, this chapter has focused on the external factors 
that provided unique and highly beneficial incentives for Hezbollah to participate in the 
Lebanese political system and move to non-violent forms of political expression. The 
end of the Lebanese civil war and Syrian implementation of the Ta’if Agreement created 
an environment where Hezbollah not only gained a secure environment from which to 
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pursue their goals, but also a level of legitimacy and approval from the state. Accepting 
and participating in the Lebanese political system post-Ta’if Agreement was an 
attractive proposition for the organization based on its benefits, but the cost of rejecting 
the Agreement was equally, if not more, unattractive. Hezbollah did, however, have to 
contend with the possible consequences of accepting the Agreement from the 
ideological purists that came from two positions in the organization: the leadership and 
their membership. It was now a matter of organizing party leadership in the same 
coherent direction and consolidating support from the Lebanese public. 
5.2 Internal/Organizational/Group Factors 
The instrumental approach focuses on the environmental variables presented to 
the organization in a way that creates a clear picture of the kind, and importance, of 
outside influences affecting the organization’s decision making process. From there, it 
seems logical that the organization would deduce the appropriate course of action by 
simply following the cost versus benefit analysis of the relevant variables at play. The 
limitation of the instrumental approach, however, is that it creates an identity of an 
organization that is conceptually similar to that of individual consciousness, ignoring 
that while the practical sum of variables may suggest acting in one way, the emotions 
and relationships of individuals that comprise the group may steer the organization 
down a different path. Ultimately, the instrumental approach alone is insufficient for 
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analyzing the actions of organizations as it ignores the internal dynamics made up of a 
myriad of individual relationships and power dynamics. The mixture of motivations of 
individuals comprising Hezbollah’s leadership and membership were just as important 
during this time period as the practical influences examined above.  
 In order to address the limitations of the instrumental approach this section will 
draw on Martha Crenshaw’s “Organizational Approach” to studying terrorist 
organizations.230 The central focus will be the examination of the personal ambitions of 
Hezbollah’s membership, the relationships and interplay within the organization in 
response to the proposed new direction, and how influential actors in the leadership 
were successful in consolidating support for the organization’s ideological and political 
transition moving forward to the 1992 election. 
The implementation of the Ta’if Agreement smoothed the way for Hezbollah’s 
participation in the reconstituted arena but could not entirely be left to Syria’s 
machinations. The main actors involved – Hezbollah and the Lebanese authorities – had 
to come to terms with working together and promoting that partnership to their 
respective constituencies. In other words, while the implementation of the Ta’if gave 
Hezbollah a perfect opportunity to participate in the Lebanese political system, 
Hezbollah still needed to address changes in their ideology and organizational makeup 
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to facilitate this process while simultaneously maintaining the support of those who 
subscribed to their original political goals. 
Similar situations are not unheard of and usually feature direct or implicit 
bargaining between the radical political organizations, which become willing to 
transform themselves into moderate political actors, and the governments that control 
the political arena. Essential to negotiations is that the radical organization must first 
renounce its hostility towards the state and agree to abide by the same structural rules 
applicable to all other political actors participating within the system.231 On the other 
hand, the state guarantees the transforming organization the protection and rights that 
are due to legitimate political organizations working in the system. This is exactly the 
agreement that was negotiated between the parties. 
The agreement was absolutely necessary in order for Hezbollah to be viewed as a 
legitimate state actor that participated in the political process in Lebanon, however, it 
also necessitated a major ideological change within the organization. Central to 
Hezbollah’s original political machinations and resistance identity was the rejection of 
the democratic process in Lebanon and promoting the formation of an Islamic state.232 
Obviously Hezbollah could remain in opposition to the new government, but their 
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opposition would be a far cry from its original radical stance of outright rejecting the 
entire political order in the country.  
The understanding between Hezbollah and the government meant generally that 
each actor had to accept the legitimacy of the other, regardless of the ideological or 
practical difficulties. For Hezbollah, this meant cooperating with a secular government 
instead of heeding religious imperatives to overthrow it, a move that was resisted by 
the hardline party ideologues. On the opposite end of the spectrum, to fully participate 
in the democratic Lebanese political system Hezbollah would be required to broaden its 
ideological and political appeal in order to secure the necessary public support to be 
successful. In order to facilitate this transition Hezbollah focused on several key internal 
and organizational changes. The first involved two significant changes to their stated 
ideology aimed at broadening their political appeal. In order to secure the support of 
their more radical constituents their ideology needed to be restated in a way that 
rationalized compromise with the government from an Islamic perspective. 
Simultaneously, Hezbollah needed to engender jihad to not only the Muslims in 
Lebanon, but also the Maronite Christian population. This meant creating a national 
dialogue and understanding of jihad as representative of the national interest. Finally, to 
complete their integration into the function of day to day Lebanese society, Hezbollah 
responded to the political situation in Lebanon by focusing on addressing shortcomings 
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of the newly formed government’s ability to provide social services to the Shi’a citizens 
of Lebanon. This helped them appeal ideologically and practically to the general 
population as much, if not more, than their focus on military resistance to Israel. 
In 1989, Hezbollah held their first conclave and revealed the identity of their 
leaders and cadres. The conclave resulted in the creation of the post of secretary-
general, with Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli elected to the position, and the nomination of a 
seven member Shura council.233 While Subhi al-Tufayli promoted the original 
fundamental approach articulated in the Open Letter, the committee took a more 
moderate position. They understood that under the prevailing conditions in Lebanon 
ideological rigidity would deny their armed struggle against Israel the national 
legitimacy necessary to win it strong and continuous Lebanese support.234 As secretary-
general was the foremost post within the organization, Hezbollah was locked in an 
intense debate about how to proceed given Lebanon’s new political environment based 
in the proper interpretation of wilayat al-faqih.235 In order for Hezbollah’s transition to be 
successful moving forward, the disagreement between the secretary-general and council 
would have to be resolved. 
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In order to facilitate participation in the elections, Hezbollah required approval 
of the council and from the faqih. The council requested the formal legal opinion of the 
faqih representative, in this case Hezbollah’s Religious Leader Khamina or al-Sayyid al-
Qa’id, on the legitimacy of participating in the 1992 elections. By interpreting the 
doctrine of wilayat al-faqih in a new light, the committee recommended that participation 
in the elections be a beneficiary must. This is in accord with the holistic parts of the 
organization’s ideology that speaks to serving the socio-economic and political interests 
of the people.236 The committee reasoned that participating in the elections would lead 
to the achievement of good political results, would be regarded as the leading step 
towards interaction with others, and as such would be consistent with Hezbollah’s 
views of greater jihad discussed in the previous chapter. Khamina agreed, authorizing 
and supporting participation, a move contested by hard line party followers and 
secretary-general Subhi al-Tufayli. 
With the election approaching, Subhi al-Tufayli’s firm, uncompromising political 
discourse and his repeated references to establishing an Islamic state, which was 
unprecedented in Lebanese political discourse, backfired domestically and threatened 
to alienate the party from other political and social movements during a transitional 
time in Lebanese politics.237 In order to capitalize on the political opportunity of 
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participating in the Lebanese parliamentary system presented, Hezbollah required that 
their transformed ideology be endorsed unanimously by party leadership. Thus, in May 
1991, Hezbollah held their second conclave, electing the more moderate Abbas al-
Musawi to the post of secretary-general and Shaykh Naim Qassem as his deputy.238 
With the leadership unified, the conclave immediately set the written moral precepts 
upon which political dialogue would be conducted with the Christians and adopting a 
more transparent approach to their organizational structure moving forward.  
Hezbollah would employ the term infitah (opening-up) to denote their political 
discourse, actions, and policies in the era of their political program, or simply to signify 
their enrolment in Lebanese domestic political life from this point on.239 The goal of 
infitah for Hezbollah is to participate in an open dialogue policy in a pluralistic setting 
through interaction and cooperation with all Lebanese sects and communities that 
comprise the Lebanon, in order to rid Lebanon of its political and social problems and 
foster national unity. Properly articulating this strategy would be the priority of the 
committee and Hezbollah’s leadership moving forward. 
To summarize, the committee concluded that the pros to transitioning into the 
Lebanese political system vastly outweighed the cons. Participating in Lebanese 
parliamentary politics is worthwhile since it is viewed as one of the ways Hezbollah 
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could influence the system and make their voice heard. This applied not only 
domestically, but also regionally and internationally through the avenues made 
available to the Lebanese members of parliament. The views of the council and 
secretary-general needed to be consolidated before the organization could truly pursue 
this course of action, leading to the election of a new secretary-general. In order to take 
advantage of this new direction, however, Hezbollah would have find ways to 
transform their image from radical group to progressive political party among members 
and non-members alike. Choosing to participate did nothing to guarantee success. 
Hezbollah needed to find a way to re-invent their image in order to appeal to the 
general public, but in a way that would not alienate their fundamentalist support base.  
One of the potential problems threatening parties that are shifting from radical to 
mainstream status is the potential backlash, or outright rejection, of core adherents to 
the organizations original principles and ideology. These members place the ‘purity’ of 
the organizations original goals and ideological message above demands of practical 
politics.240 Therefore, these organizations must find a way to convince pious partisans 
that despite appearances to the contrary, God’s sacred command to promote His rule on 
earth is not being abandoned. By promoting their new ideological interpretation of 
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Islamic teachings, Hezbollah had to be aware of this potential threat and articulate their 
goals in a way that would not alienate their fundamentalist membership. 
Establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon was central to the concept of jihad 
promoted by Hezbollah in the Open Letter. The Islamic mandate to fight injustice and 
eliminate usurpers clearly includes impious rulers whose governments do not apply 
Islamic law.241 In order to accommodate their transformation Hezbollah needed a reason 
that could be justified to their hardline party followers that would waive its obligation 
of jihad against Lebanon’s heretical government. The reasoning came in a slight 
alteration to the organization’s stance on the promotion of jihad and reinforced the 
flexible definition of jihad covered in Chapter 4.  
The alteration was drawn from early theological debates over the justifiable 
courses of action that could be taken by the Muslim community if the abuse of authority 
necessitated resistance to the state. Abdelazziz Sachedena, an expert on Islamic 
activism, writes that “in early Shi’ite history it had become firmly established that every 
pious Muslim was to oppose any nominally Muslim authority regarded as corrupt and 
degenerate as long as such opposition did not endanger the believers’ lives”.242 This 
injunction was previously used to rationalize Arab unwillingness to wage jihad against 
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the western powers occupying Arab lands after the Second World War.243 The objective 
conditions on Hezbollah in Lebanon were similar to these past constraints and as such 
made a conciliatory approach by Hezbollah in its relationship with the Lebanese 
government justifiable to the majority of its radical supporters.  
For those unconvinced by the rationalization provided above, Hezbollah placed 
further emphasis on the interpretation of jihad discussed at length in chapter 4 – namely 
that jihad is not limited to the idea of holy war in a purely militant sense. By focusing 
more closely on greater jihad, characterized by the expression of a struggle for the sake of 
Islam, Hezbollah could easily justify membership in Lebanese Parliament. Islamist MPs 
would be able to use the parliamentary forum as a means of drawing attention to the 
sub-standard conditions in Shi’a areas or to corruption that prevented social and 
economic development. The context meant that Hezbollah would not be foregoing their 
ongoing struggle but rather directing a portion of their efforts into an arena that would 
broaden their pursuit of social justice for Muslims. Hezbollah may not have had a 
monopoly on Shi’a allegiance, but they did manage to convince their fundamentalist 
base to stay on board.244 This was accomplished because of a desire amongst individuals 
to be deeply associated with a holy war against Israel and a clear realization that the 
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geopolitical factors that had come together to produce the opportunity to legitimize this 
struggle for the Islamic community were simply too outstanding to reject. 
Hezbollah needed to balance their message in a way that would not alienate the 
radical elements of the party but that could also convince the doubters among the 
general public that the organization’s aims moving forward were for the good of the 
nation and would not be detrimental to the broader Lebanese community. While 
Christians were likely the most concerned about Hezbollah’s political designs, many 
Muslims shared a level of apprehension about Hezbollah’s political aims.245 This meant 
that if Hezbollah hoped to successfully integrate into mainstream political life and 
legitimize jihad as the expression of the national will they would need to mitigate, or 
preferably alter, these negatives attitudes. 
The conscious effort of infitah made by Hezbollah allowed them to control the 
declaration of their goals, strategies, and organizational makeup to the public. This 
lifted the veil of secrecy that surrounded the group since its creation and afforded the 
organization the opportunity to emphasize key ideological concepts based on their 
target audience.246 This common political tactic used by parties in democratic countries 
is known as ideological ambiguity.247 Hezbollah expresses moderate political goals to 
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the general public while at the same time reinforcing their resistance agenda whose 
roots lay in concepts of greater and lesser jihad. In doing so, the organization has been 
successful in accommodating and changing their identity within the guidelines of 
Islamic ideology and in ways that relieve tension in the community at large.248  
Hezbollah employed a bottom-up Islamization strategy, one that stressed that 
their religious and political ideology defends the establishment of an Islamic state in 
Lebanon. As a political program, however, establishing an Islamic state is not practical 
because of the confessional and sectarian nature of Lebanon and because the majority of 
the Lebanese population is in opposition. Ultimately, Hezbollah shelved their original 
political ideology to focus on a more pragmatic political program in order to appeal to 
the largest possible sector of the Lebanese population.  
By 1990, roughly a year since the Ta’if Agreement had been signed and began 
being implemented, Lebanon was preparing to hold its first elections in over a decade.249 
This was the perfect opportunity for Hezbollah to participate in the Lebanese political 
system to show the sincerity of their transformation and simultaneously to solidify the 
group’s political legitimacy by acquiring parliamentary representation. Similar to any 
mainstream party, Hezbollah had begun operating a wide network of social and public 
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services in the Bekaa valley and Beirut’s dahiyeh in order to secure support.250 These 
kinds of activities are regularly undertaken by political parties to secure the support of 
their constituents, but Hezbollah’s reputation at this point was almost entirely tied to 
their resistance activity against the Israelis. These resistance activities gained the party a 
considerable amount of respect from the public, but it was still unclear how the Party of 
God would fare in non-violent political activity. 
From an organizational standpoint, by consolidating the direction of the 
leadership and maintaining the continued support of the majority of its membership, 
Hezbollah had accomplished two of their primary objectives in their process of 
transition. Their focus now was on establishing a broader appeal to the Lebanese public 
in order to foster relationships with individuals that typically would not affiliate 
themselves with the party. Hezbollah’s ability to provide social and public services in 
Muslim areas had a significant impact on increasing the party’s appeal.251 These services 
were offered in a professional atmosphere that would not have been possible without 
careful planning and special attention to social and public service delivery systems, 
which is the key organizational transformation that allowed Hezbollah to fully embrace 
their new direction. The civil war had created extensive administrative and service gaps 
throughout Lebanon, leading many militias to create mini-public administrations in 
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territory they controlled.252 This included a variety of services like electricity, road 
repair, and educational and health services among others.253 Disbanding the militias in 
the post-Ta’if period created a void that Hezbollah had the resources to address, in part 
because of their level of sponsorship from Iran but more so because they had been 
providing these services for several years already.  
A significant difference between Hezbollah and other militias in the years 
leading to the Ta’if changes was the manner in which they were able to fund their 
public services. Whereas other groups were forced to rely on exploiting government 
resources to support their administrations, Hezbollah was heavily subsidized by Iranian 
institutions.254 This gave Hezbollah a level of moral superiority in the eyes of the public 
over their opposition, namely Amal, because they could never be accused of having 
taken advantage of the disintegrating Lebanese state.255 Hezbollah’s disciplined nature 
and backing from Tehran helped the organization reinforce their image as the best 
alternative to not only the other militias, but also to the state. 
The large scale level of investment from Tehran gave another significant 
advantage to Hezbollah, the ability to address the scope and variety of needs of Shi’a 
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Muslims in southern Lebanon that exceeded those of other Lebanese communities. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the areas where there was the heaviest Shi’a concentration, the 
Bekaa Valley and the South, had been neglected in terms of infrastructure and public 
services since Ottoman rule. The destruction and deterioration of already minimal and 
venerable infrastructure from both the civil war and Israeli invasions worsened the 
situation and hastened immigration to Beirut – where services were already 
marginalized for many of the same reasons.256 When Hezbollah took control of the 
dahiyeh in 1989, they found themselves responsible for roughly half a million inhabitants 
that were straining the insufficient infrastructure to the verge of collapse.257 By tackling 
the infrastructure issues in the region Hezbollah increased their appeal to the 
community and further reinforced their distinct identity from the Lebanese state, one 
that portrayed them as a competent competitor in providing for the needs of the 
Lebanese people.  
With Hezbollah offering the majority of social and public services in the region 
and with the organization’s military involvement resisting the Israeli occupation, 
Hezbollah became indispensable to the southern Lebanese community. Former Deputy 
Secretary General of Hezbollah Naim Qassem writes,  
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“Social work serves to enrich supporters’ confidence in the viability of the Party’s 
cause and course, as it cooperates, collaborates and joins forces to remain strong 
and tenacious in its political and resistance roles. This fosters humane and social 
environments of joint responsibility, thus shielding the Resistance from social 
catastrophes – those from which the government simply alienated itself”.258  
 
Through this cooperation and collaboration, Hezbollah has successfully intertwined 
themselves in the Lebanese communal and political lives in an administrative capacity 
while simultaneously cultivating an identity that remains distinct from the state itself.  
Hezbollah reinforced their integration by remaining faithful to their Shi’a 
constituency by employing a bottom-up Islamization process and working within the 
Lebanese state’s political and administrative structures while simultaneously 
establishing Islamic institutions across Lebanese civil society.259 Once the leadership had 
been unified in the same direction, they successfully reinforced their relationships with 
existing members, simultaneously endeared themselves to a larger portion of the 
Lebanese community, and created the foundation to establish positive relationships 
with individuals who were apathetic or hostile to the organization at their outset. 
Through their vast network of social services, Hezbollah is able to earn political capital 
in Lebanon, capital they spend on acquiring cultural and socio-economic influence in 
line with its mission of accomplishing social justice according to the tenets of Shi’a 
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jurisprudence, effective combining their resistance identity with the broader Lebanese 
political identity. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The Ta’if Agreement and subsequent decision to participate in electoral politics 
were two pivotal events in shaping Hezbollah’s identity and the Lebanese political 
landscape moving forward. The Agreement marked the beginning of Hezbollah’s 
gradual adoption of pragmatic policies aimed at coordination and cooperation, rather 
than conflict, with the Lebanese state. By participating in post-Ta’if Lebanese politics, 
Hezbollah protects the legitimacy of their resistance identity and maintains an 
environment for its continued promotion. Thus, Hezbollah’s participation in a political 
system it previously deemed inimical to its religio-political beliefs and their initial goals 
of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon is for pragmatic reasons that revolve around 
the needs to safeguard the resistance, their weapons, and their right of violence against 
Israeli occupation. 
The logic of operating within the bounds of the Lebanese state prevailed over the 
logic of the revolution. Relying on the progressive nature of Shi’a jurisprudence, 
Hezbollah was able to successfully remold, construct, and interpret its authority in such 
a way as to render legitimacy to their participation in a pluralist polity based upon the 
quota system and patronage. Accompanying this ideological shift were periods of 
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progress and development within the social service context that constructively 
reinforced its humanistic agenda, allowing the organization to legitimize itself through 
the accumulation, conversion, and transformation of social, economic, and symbolic 
capitals into political capital. In this way, Hezbollah was capable of adopting mainly 
non-violent forms of political expression that were functional in a multi-confessional 
and multi-religious society without compromising their Islamic ideology or the 
legitimacy of their resistance identity. 
The instrumental approach is based on the assumption that acts of violence are a 
deliberate choice by a political actor. The organization, as a unit, acts to achieve 
collective values, often involving radical changes in political and social conditions.260 
The pure cost versus benefit analysis of the organization means that an increase in cost 
or a decrease in reward for violent political expression will make it less likely. The 
organizational approach, however, focuses on internal processes within the group using 
violence. Violent political expression is explained as the result of an organization’s 
struggle for survival, usually in an extremely competitive environment.261 Leaders 
ensure organizational maintenance by offering varied incentives to followers, not all of 
which involve the pursuit of the group’s stated political purposes. Both explanations are 
necessary to effectively analyze Hezbollah’s political transformation. The changing 
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political and security environment created by the Ta’if Agreement and Israeli 
withdrawal created considerable incentives for Hezbollah to pursue non-violent means 
of political expression and include themselves in legitimate Lebanese politics. The cost 
versus benefit analysis of the instrumental approach, however, is insufficient when 
analyzing Hezbollah’s endeavor into social services. By adopting non-violent means of 
political expression Hezbollah effectively managed to create a system of incentives for 
both radical and non-radical individuals, ensuring the survival and expansion of their 
organization moving forward. 
Studying and understanding terrorism as a political phenomenon is challenged 
primarily by questions involving how it should be defined and to whom it should be 
applied. Hezbollah’s political transition shows us that while the organization has 
embraced violent means of political expression in the past typically associated with 
definitions of terrorism, terrorism is by no means how the organization, or its members, 
view its struggle to express itself politically.  
Political violence as a means of political expression will not be ending anytime 
soon. Moving forward, however, it is important for academics studying political 
violence to be conscious of the pejorative nature of definitions of terrorism and how 
those definitions frame the narrative of their research in terms of “Us vs Them”. Both 
the definitions and the narrative they create inevitably lead to bias and compromise 
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objectivity by focusing more on what the organization has done in its relationship with 
the state, and focusing less what the state, has done in its relationship to the 
organization. As I’ve shown in this thesis, that relationship is much more complex than 
an “Us vs Them” comparative narrative is able to define. 
The case of Hezbollah’s transition into non-violent forms of political expression 
shows that understanding terrorism as an identity instead of a tactic may satisfy the 
perception of an “Us vs Them” struggle, but is flawed when applying it to objective 
academic analysis and attempts to understand the organizations that use terrorism as a 
means of political expression. Terrorism isn’t an identity, it’s a tactic used by groups at 
various times, one that may become more or less attractive based on circumstances 
shaped by both external variables and organizational dynamics – one that behooves us 
to reassess our method of study for the sake of objectivity in efforts to better understand 
political violence moving forward. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The final chapter of this thesis is structured into three parts. The first will briefly 
examine Hezbollah’s participation in both resistance and social welfare activities in 
Lebanon since 1992. While not an exhaustive history, the aim of presenting the material 
is an attempt to gain insight into whether Hezbollah’s political transition can be 
considered an expression or rejection of the sectarian system in Lebanon. Only after the 
Lebanese political system made changes to be more inclusionary did Hezbollah choose 
to participate, suggesting that expressing their political agency legitimately in an 
imperfect system is preferable to illegitimate violent means of political expression. The 
second section is focused on some general observations of arguable shortcomings in 
International Relations academic research. The problem with state centric definitions 
and theories about power and legitimacy will need to be addressed when studying 
violent conflict/terrorism in the future. The final section will build on these theoretical 
problems and aims to address some of the difficulties with defining terrorism, 
concluding by making some recommendations for dealing with these challenges in 
academic research moving forward. 
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6.1 After the 1992 Election: Hezbollah Post-Transition 
Hezbollah’s ideology and core principles are rooted in their religious beliefs, and, 
as such, have remained constant throughout their political and organizational 
development. At the same time, the organization has shown a capacity to adapt their 
discourse to the changing security and political environment. Through a political savvy 
articulation, Hezbollah’s “right to violence” binds legitimacy, authority, and violence 
together in ways that generally tend to be the sole purview of the sovereign state. 
Similarly, Hezbollah has adopted many of the duties and responsibilities traditionally 
belonging to the state through their vast social welfare network. By combining their 
armed resistance agenda with social welfare policy, Hezbollah continues to transmit the 
concept of resistance to the population as one around which life and everyday action 
revolves. 
In contrast to Hezbollah’s foreign policy, which has shown remarkable 
continuity throughout its development, the organization’s view of their role within 
Lebanon has shifted considerably since their original formulation. Hezbollah today has 
created a social welfare network that aims to transform Lebanon’s poor Shi’a 
neighborhoods into self-reliant districts.262 Perhaps most surprisingly, even with 
Hezbollah’s active participation in Lebanese parliament these services are funded 
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entirely by the party, relieving a substantial amount of social and economic pressure on 
the state itself.263 In this way Hezbollah is very similar to other global social movements 
that focus their efforts on obtaining and providing social goods and services to their 
main constituency. Hezbollah itself excels because they are capable of funding these 
services on their own, regardless of support from the state apparatus. Their network 
includes social services such as water sanitation, rural development, construction 
projects, education, hospitals, and perhaps most importantly to their constituency they 
directly fund the reconstruction of every home destroyed as a result of the conflict with 
Israel. This makes Hezbollah the largest provider of social welfare services in Lebanon, 
ahead of the state itself.264 This does not mean, however, that resistance operations have 
ceased or become less of a priority. Simply, Hezbollah has continued to expand the 
focus of their political identity since 1992 to include an increasing number of non-
violent enterprises in Lebanon. 
Since the late 1980’s Hezbollah has paid particular attention to developing their 
social welfare network. The first subsidiary group to be established by the organization 
was the Jihad al-Binaa Association. This organization focuses on construction and 
development of neighborhoods damaged during the Israeli conflict.265 This includes the 
re-construction of every home, shop, and public utility structure damaged by Israeli 
                                                          
263 Ibid., 67. 
264 Ibid., 68. 
265 Qassem, Hizbullah, 83. 
131 
 
raids since 1991.266 Furthermore, the organization provides waste collection and clean 
drinking water in the southern territories where there is no access to these public 
services at no cost to the residents.267 Hezbollah also founded the Islamic Health 
Organization (IHO) that manages nine hospitals, as well as sixteen fixed and three 
mobile infirmaries, that cater to fifty one southern villages.268 These are only a handful 
of the social services provided by Hezbollah in Lebanon, services they believe “expose 
the extent of government negligence and deficiency in their fundamental duties”.269 
These services are aimed at enriching confidence and support in the viability of 
Hezbollah’s cause and course in both their political and resistance goals. 
Hezbollah was able to increase these services in part because in 1999 Israel 
elected General Ehud Barak who had campaigned on the promise that he would 
withdraw from Lebanon within twelve months of assuming office.270 Although it was 
widely believed in Lebanon that the violence against the Jewish state would stop after 
the Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah avoided confirming this publicly.271 The withdrawal 
finally occurred on May 24, 2000, starting a time of extraordinary celebration in 
Lebanon, especially in the South, and displaced residents immediately flooded back to 
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their liberated homes and villages.272 Very little associated violence occurred during this 
time, certainly none of the anticipated revenge killings of SLA or Israeli supporters. 
Overall, that period was remarkably orderly and humane, especially in comparison to 
the violent history of Lebanon in the preceding decades. 
 The Israeli withdrawal was important because it was considered a major victory 
for Lebanon, and more specifically Hezbollah, but also because it created a crossroads 
for the organization. Should the organization focus on Lebanese politics and themes, 
such as government, or should their focus remain on the resistance priority in both 
Lebanon and the Middle East? The situation was in no way as dire as the decision 
required post-Ta’if, but Hezbollah would need to find a way to justify continued 
resistance with the Israeli withdrawal. After internal party discussions it was decided 
the resistance identity would remain the primary focus of the organization, citing the 
Israeli-occupied Golan Heights as territory that belonged to Lebanon and thus a 
justification to maintain their military posture on the pretext that the Israeli withdrawal 
had not been completed.273  
The focus here is not an exhaustive look at Hezbollah after the 1992 election, but 
rather to show that while the organization has evolved considerably from their early 
militant beginnings its raison d’être remains resistance activity. At the same time, the 
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group’s followers trust and support Hezbollah because of their successful record of 
providing a functioning welfare system to the Shi’a community within Lebanon, in 
addition to their military activities. Similarly to how Hezbollah was able to capitalize on 
the environmental conditions post-Ta’if by utilizing a level of ideological flexibility, the 
organization continues to transform themselves and their message in such a way that 
legitimizes their position within Lebanese political institutions while simultaneously 
reinforcing the dialogue that perpetuates their right to violent resistance.  
By engaging in a pluralistic process, Hezbollah shifted their political strategy 
from cooptation to contestation, and finally, to exercising empowerment. Thus, 
Hezbollah moved from being a closed sectarian social movement to an open national 
actor engaging in Lebanese domestic political life. Due to the absence of certain social 
and political circumstances, Hezbollah has adopted a strategy of self- preservation, 
which entails indefinitely postponing the destruction of the Lebanese sectarian system 
and establishment of an Islamic state in its place.274 This has led many scholars to 
suggest that Hezbollah derives their legitimacy strictly from political participation in 
Lebanon. Krista Weirand, for example, writes that: 
Hezbollah’s domestic legitimacy comes primarily from its willingness to 
participate within the political system in Lebanon rather than outside the status 
quo by acting as a legal political party and by having representatives in the 
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Lebanese parliament and cabinet. It is also a result of Hezbollah’s willingness to 
adapt to the demands of the public in order to maintain domestic support.275  
Viewing legitimacy in narrow terms such as this betrays the complex ways in which 
Hezbollah has politicized Shi’a culture to construct their own “resistance society” as an 
ideal political community. Hezbollah’s activities then, and further the means by which 
they acquire legitimacy in the Lebanese context, must be understood well beyond either 
their military or parliamentary services. Thus, the question of whether Hezbollah is an 
expression or rejection of the Lebanese sectarian system is less important than 
understanding how the organization articulates their particular notion of political 
community, and then how they create a cultural, material, and political-economic reality 
around that dialogue.276  
6.2 Questions Facing International Relations Moving Forward 
The case of Hezbollah and their articulation of their “resistance identity” is a 
clear example in which the typical definitions and theories of International Relations 
(IR) faces significant challenges. Rather than a positive affirmation of Hezbollah’s 
resistance identity as the result of a mixture of communal identity around effective 
institutions, theories of IR and their comprehension of sovereignty frames actors like 
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Hezbollah, by virtue of acting outside the state, as problematic by definition.277 Simply, 
theories and definitions in IR that articulate legitimate authority are entirely too state 
centric and serve to reinforce the interests of the more powerful states at the expense of 
the weaker non-state actors. Whether the result of pragmatic political concerns allegedly 
for the sake of international order and stability, supposed commitments to 
methodological elegance, or simply intellectual lethargy, the prevailing prosaic accounts 
of sovereignty serve particular power interests and as such should be re-examined to 
determine their efficacy in IR research moving forward. 
 In an attempt to address the issues surrounding the narrow application of 
categories and definitions standard in IR discourse, a major research agenda could start 
with questioning the definition of the core focus of International Relations: the state. 
The emergence of non-territorial forms of governance globally, such as Hezbollah, is 
challenging the context in which we perceive legitimacy and authority in IR.278  The 
cultural-political trajectory of Hezbollah speaks directly to the type of processes and 
patterns that tend to fall outside the narrow attention of traditional Western IR 
research.279 By examining the world through a lens that has been preconfigured by the 
popular focuses of IR theory, we not only fail to include actors such as Hezbollah, but 
more importantly, we fail to consider the diverse forms of legitimacy, authority, and 
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violence represented by these actors.280 As a result, this leaves our research hampered by 
morally biased and emotionally charged language and definitions such as terrorism. 
6.3 Conclusion: The Question of Terrorism 
Traditional research in International Relations accords a heavy emphasis on the 
legitimacy of colonial-era Western conceptualizations of the state. This state centric 
thinking in IR creates a narrative where the historical state monopoly on violence is 
increasingly insufficient as a means to discuss current accounts of globalization, 
especially in the post-colonial Middle East. Thinking of power and legitimate political 
agency in these narrow terms serves to reinforce the binary discourse that dominates 
current accounts of globalization, the one side focusing on the absolute sovereignty of 
the state and the other with the possibility this sovereignty is being eroded. As a 
consequence, academics struggle with its delegitimizing effects on forms of legitimacy, 
authority, and violence that fall outside of these state centric definitions, such as 
terrorism.281 The study of terrorism faces the problem of not only distinguishing it from 
other forms of violence, but also of setting clear theoretical bounds around their field of 
inquiry.282 How can contemporary research get around the popular, but generally 
biased and confusing, definitions of terrorism so as to reach a scientific one? There are 
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multiple ways that academics are trying to address the question, but I will finish this 
thesis focusing on two. The first is to view terrorism as the result of a social, economic, 
and political equation, and then to focus instead on the actors and their actions. This 
approach aims to dismantle the pejorative and particularly distressing nature of 
traditional definitions of terrorism. The second approach remains focused on the actors 
and their actions, however, they do so in the hopes that their research will possibly 
refine the definition of terrorism by isolating other attributes.283 While both viewpoints 
can be useful for studying terrorism, the failure in these approaches is that both use 
traditional IR definitions of power, authority, and legitimacy as the mold in which they 
attempt to fit their redefined versions of terrorism. 
Most scholars attempt to work around the challenge of defining terrorism by 
distinguishing two sorts of problems, or kinds of, terrorism. They attempt to compare 
“limited terrorism” to “terrorism without boundaries”.284 By doing so they attempt to 
make a distinction between terrorism as a method of action, a tool used by certain 
groups to attain a political end, and terrorism as the logic of action, where terror is the 
end in itself.285 This ignores, however, that terrorism is often only one part of a complex 
political or geopolitical process. Equating acts of violence performed by those who 
pursue a specific purpose, but have the means to abandon terrorism in their political 
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environment, to acts of violence by organizations that neither foresee nor expect an end 
to terrorism is a serious problem within terrorism literature. 
The concept of terrorism is often argued not to be a scientific category, but a 
biased observation from the general public or, at best, from the persons actively 
involved or directly concerned by the phenomenon. Although the majority can easily 
agree that the pejorative nature of definitions of terrorism should be avoided at worst, 
and deconstructed at best, there is no impetus on academics to begin their research with 
finding a suitable way to redefine the term. Rather, its definition can be derived from 
the outcome instead of the starting point of our analyses, a conclusion rather than a 
presupposition.286 In doing away with stereotypes we accept there is potentially no 
cause and effect hierarchy can be applied in a general way to terrorism. This puts us in 
uncomfortable territory, however, because by accepting that without a general cause 
and effect correlation to terrorism there may be no real way to develop effective policy 
recommendations. The idea that terrorism is “bad” and should be stopped is a 
pervasive one. That said, there remains a possibility that by redefining our own 
professional standards and intellectual relation to this dangerous subject that we find 
the answers to effective counter-terrorism policy that so far have arguably evaded IR 
researchers. 
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The study of terrorism is a research subject filled with challenges from all sides. 
This can possibly include physical danger, but more importantly it often challenges our 
conceptualizations of morality and justice. This thesis is in no way aimed toward 
expressing political sympathies with Hezbollah. Rather, the goal of this research has 
been to provide a study of Hezbollah that approached the topic from alternative 
methods of reasoning than the traditional IR accounts and explore rational possibilities 
for alternative articulations of political power and legitimacy.  
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